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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses  market clearing real business  cycle models.  In these 
models,  economic  fluctuations  are characterized by movements  along a 
stable labor supply  curve.  As a result,  real wages  and labor input both 
move  together  with  output.  Although  the  procyclical behavior  of real 
wages  has  been  debated,  the  current  consensus  seems  to be  that real 
wages  are moderately  procyclical (Bils 1985; Kydland and Prescott 1988; 
Solon and Barsky 1988). 
There  are  four  separate  classes  of  explanations  of  procyclical  real 
wages  in a decentralized  market clearing  framework.  In the first three 
explanations,  labor  productivity  is  procyclical,  and  real wages  follow 
productivity.  These  three  explanations  can be  summarized  by  writing 
the production  function: 
y(t) =  y(t) F(K(t),L(t)),  (1) 
where  y is the  technological  shock,  K is the capital, L is labor, and y is 
output  at time t. Labor productivity  at time t can be high if either (a) the 
productivity  shock  y is high  at time t, or (b) the capital stock is high  at 
time t, or (c) the labor input  is high  at time  t, and production  function 
exhibits increasing  returns to scale. The first explanation  of high produc- 
tivity in booms  drives  the  real business  cycle  theories  of Kydland  and 
Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983), and Prescott (1986). The second 
explanation  is the basis of models  in which  booms  result from increases 
in the capital stock.  Shleifer (1986) and Kiyotaki (1988) present examples 
of such models  where  increasing returns help generate endogenous  fluc- 
tuations,  but  the  driving  force behind  output  fluctuations  over  time is 248- MURPHY,  SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
really  the  changes  in  the  capital  stock.  The  third  explanation  of  pro- 
cyclical productivity  is increasing  returns in the form of declining  mar- 
ginal  cost,  either  at  an  industry  or an  economy-wide  level.  Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny  (1988) is an example  of such a model. 
Procyclical productivity  is not the only way to generate procyclical real 
wages;  countercyclical  markups of price over cost also give this result. In 
some  models  (Phelps  and  Winter  1970; Okun  1981; Stiglitz  1984; Bils 
1986), demand  becomes  less  elastic during recessions,  perhaps because 
customers  with  elastic demand  leave  the market, and so optimal mark- 
ups rise. In other models  (Weitzman 1982; Solow  1984; Hammour  1988), 
markets  are  monopolistically  competitive  and  the  price  is  tied  to  the 
average  cost which  falls in a larger market. As a result,  markups fall in 
the  boom  and  real  wages  are  procyclical.  In  yet  another  approach 
(Rotemberg and Saloner 1986), competition  between  oligopolists  intensi- 
fies  and  markups  fall in a boom.  In all these  models-whether  or not 
they assume  increasing returns-procyclical  real wages result from coun- 
tercyclical  markups  and  not  from  procyclical  marginal  productivity. 
These  models  should  be  distinguished  from  those  with  real  wages 
driven by procyclical productivity. 
In this  paper,  we  focus  on  the  comparison  of increasing  returns (IR) 
and technological  shock (TS) real business  cycle models.  We spend  rela- 
tively  little time  on  models  driven  by changes  in the capital stock.  Al- 
though  additions  to the  capital stock probably raise productivity  in the 
later stages  of the boom,  capital stock changes  cannot explain all of the 
business  cycle,  particularly productivity  movements  during periods and 
in sectors  of no capacity addition.  We also do not spend  much  time on 
countercyclical markup stories,  although  we do find them attractive. The 
main reason  for this  omission  is that our own  work has focused  on IR 
models.  We also do not deal with  models  that do not fit into the market 
clearing framework.  Some  of the  relevant  papers  (Roberts 1987; Heller 
1986) replace  perfectly  functioning  markets with  market games;  others 
(Cooper  and  Haltiwanger  1989) present  centrally  planned  allocations. 
Finally, we  do  not  focus  on  models  where  prices are rigid or costly  to 
change; these  models  have been  surveyed  by Rotemberg (1987). 
In comparing TS and IR models,  we stress that the building blocks that 
are likely to make these  two  approaches  work are similar, even  though 
the sources  of productivity  movements  are very different.  In particular, 
we  identify  durable  goods,  elastic  labor supply,  specialized  labor, and 
imperfect credit as key assumptions  needed  to make these models consis- 
tent  with  stylized  facts.  Although  we  occasionally  criticize existing  TS 
models,  our main task is to argue that these models  have many implica- Building  Blocks  of  Market  Clearing  Business  Cycle  Models  *  249 
tions  and  require  assumptions  similar  to  business  cycle  models  with 
increasing  returns. 
To fix ideas,  in section  2 we  present  a simple  1-sector IR model based 
on  Murphy,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1988) and  describe  its  similarities  to 
and differences  from the standard TS model.  The emphasis  in that sec- 
tion is on  the importance  of durable goods  for generating  large output 
fluctuations  without  large  changes  in  productivity.  The  section  also 
shows  that business  cycles  almost have to arise in a model  with  increas- 
ing returns,  durable  goods,  and  elastic labor supply.  We conclude  that 
the 1-sector IR model  can generate  the same essential  predictions  as the 
TS model,  and is consistent  with a broader range of evidence. 
Although  most  research  on  real business  cycles  has  focused  on  a 1- 
sector  model,  one  of  the  crucial empirical  challenges  is  to explain  the 
significant amount  of co-movement  of labor inputs and outputs in differ- 
ent sectors.  In Section  3, we  first document  this co-movement  over the 
business  cycle. We then suggest  that the TS literature has not adequately 
explained  co-movement,  even  though  this step is necessary  to generate 
aggregate  fluctuations  from  sectoral  productivity  shocks.  Finally,  we 
show  how  two  assumptions-immobility  of  labor  across  sectors  and 
imperfect  capital markets-help  generate  co-movement  in both TS and 
IR models.  To stress the similarities between  the two approaches,  we use 
a TS model  to  make  many  of  the  arguments  we  previously  made  in 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny  (1988). The upshot  of Section 3 is that with 
immobile  labor and imperfect  capital markets TS and IR models  can be 
extended  to many  sectors. 
In Section 4, we deal with  the crucial ingredient  of both the IR and the 
TS models: elastic labor supply. We discuss  some plausible and implausi- 
ble reasons  why  the  assumption  of elastic labor supply  might  be valid 
and the relevance  of micro-econometric  evidence  for this debate. 
In Section  5 we  present  some  evidence  on  the  behavior  of  relative 
prices  over  the  business  cycle.  We find  that the  relative  prices  of  fin- 
ished  goods  are much  less  procyclical  than  those  of raw materials and 
intermediate  goods.  Among  finished  goods,  durables  appear  to  have 
countercyclical  relative  prices.  Finally, output  prices are strongly  coun- 
tercyclical relative  to input  prices.  Our evidence  for the postwar  period 
basically  replicates  the  findings  of Mills (1936) and  Means  et al.  (1939) 
for the Great Depression,  except  that real wages  in the postwar  period 
have  been  procyclical  and  in the  1930s they  were  countercyclical.  This 
evidence  on  relative  prices  is  problematic  for the  view  that recessions 
result  from  adverse  shocks  to  production  functions  or prices  of  com- 
mon  inputs,  such  as oil or steel.  The evidence  favors models  based  on 250 *  MURPHY,  SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
increasing returns in distribution  or on countercyclical  markups  on fin- 
ished durables. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. A 1-Sector  Real  Business  Cycle  Model  with Increasing  Returns 
In this section we outline a 1-sector general equilibrium  model of the 
economy where production is subject  to increasing  returns  to scale. The 
model is  taken from Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), hereafter 
MSV88,  which is both more formal  and contains  considerably  more  mate- 
rial. After presenting the model,  we  compare it to the standard TS 
model. 
The model describes fluctuations in a single durable good industry 
subject  to industry-wide  increasing  returns. Because the good is durable, 
short run demand for it is extremely elastic, since consumers can easily 
substitute purchases over time. The industry-wide increasing returns 
assumption amounts to saying that productivity  is high at high industry 
output and low at low industry output, and that no individual firm can 
by itself energize the industry and move it to high output and low costs. 
The combination of flat short-run demand and downward sloping 
supply naturally  leads to instability  in the system. It is efficient for this 
industry to produce at capacity some of the time and to rest other 
times, rather than to always produce at a constant output level. More 
interestingly,  even though some output fluctuations  are efficient, equilib- 
rium output fluctuations are not. Because the industry cannot coordi- 
nate the end of a slump, firms in equilibrium  often get stuck at the low 
output level for periods of time that are much longer than is necessary 
to take advantage of increasing returns. The fact that the economy gets 
stuck at a low output level is the essence of the IR theory of economic 
fluctuations. 
2.1 DEMAND  AND SUPPLY 
We consider a model with a representative consumer maximizing the 
utility function given by: 
e-rt(u(S(t))  -  L(t))dt,  (2) 
where S(t) is the stock of durables  the consumer owns at time t, and L(t) 
is his labor supply. The assumption that labor is perfectly (or at least 
highly) substitutable  over time is important;  we return  to it in Section 4. Building  Blocks  of  Market  Clearing  Business  Cycle  Models  *  251 
The evolution  of the stock of durable goods  is given by 
S(t) = X(t) -  8S(t),  (3) 
where  X(t) is output  at time t and 8 is the depreciation  rate. 
The durability of the good  leads  to an important  distinction  between 
the long-run  and  the  short-run  demand  curves.  The long-run  demand 
curve for the good,  D(X), is given  by: 
u'(X/8) =  (r +  5)p,  (4) 
where  p is the price of the durable in utility units  or leisure  units.  This 
demand  curve is downward  sloping.  In the long-run,  at a lower price the 
consumer  demands  a higher constant  stock of durables. 
In the short-run,  in contrast,  the stock of durables is essentially  fixed, 
since  the  supply  and  depreciation  over an instant  are trivial relative to 
the  stock.  To calculate  the  short-run  demand  curve,  we  assume  that 
consumers  take  all future  purchases  as  given.  The  short-run  demand 
curve is then horizontal,  at the level of prices p(S(t)) given by the present 
value of future rental rates u'(S(T)): 
p(S(t)) =  e-(r+)i'(S(T))dT.  (5) 
At  any  price  above  p(S(t)),  the  consumer  buys  nothing  at time  t and 
consumes  leisure; at any price below  p(S(t)), his instantaneous  demand 
is infinite.  This demand  curve relies on perfect intertemporal  substitut- 
ability of leisure. 
For simplicity, we consider  an industry  subject to Marshallian external 
economies.  Assume  that there is a unit interval of competitive  firms in 
this industry, each with  a production  function: 
x= l.f(X),  (6) 
where  x is firm's output,  X is industry  output,  and 1 is the firm's labor 
input.  We assume  that each firm faces a capacity constraint,  so 1  7  1. We 
also assume  that f(O) >  0, and f'  >  0. The latter is the increasing returns 
assumption  that makes the productivity  of each firm an increasing func- 
tion of industry output. 
The Marshallian  externalities  formulation  enables  us to treat firms as 
price takers while  incorporating  increasing  returns into  the model.  We 252 *  MURPHY,  SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
use  a competitive  formulation  both  because  it is relatively  simple  and 
because  it underscores  the  fact that movements  in productivity  are re- 
sponsible  for fluctuations.  Several recent papers  (Hall 1986, 1988a; Coo- 
per and John 1988; Cooper and Haltiwanger  1989) have stressed  empiri- 
cally  and  theoretically  the  importance  of  imperfect  competition  for 
macroeconomic  fluctuations.  The assumption  of imperfect  competition 
seems  to us to serve two functions.  First, it can be the source of coordina- 
tion  problems  that  lead  to  multiple  equilibria.  Second,  it  can  be  the 
source  of  countercyclical  markups  that lead  to  procyclical behavior  of 
real wages  and  therefore  to  procyclical  labor input.  Since  Marshallian 
externalities  themselves  generate  coordination  problems,  and  since  we 
focus  on  productivity  movements  rather than countercyclical  markups 
as the  source  of real wage  changes,  we  do not need  the assumption  of 
imperfect  competition  in  the  exposition,  although  its  inclusion  might 
make the model  more realistic. 
In a competitive  equilibrium  of our industry, it must be the case that: 
x=X,  (7) 
f(X) = wlp,  (8) 
where wlp is the real wage.  These conditions  give us the industry supply 
curve,  defined  as the  locus  of price quantity  pairs that can arise as an 
industry equilibrium.  The supply  curve subsumes  the equilibrium wage, 
given  by the current and future  stocks  of durables  the consumer  owns 
that firms today take as givens.  At this equilibrium wage,  labor supply  is 
perfectly  elastic.  Accordingly,  industry  supply  at the  real wage  w/p is 
given by: 
X = f-(w/p),  (9) 
provided  that firms are not at the capacity constraint. 
Let XH  solve 
XH =  lf(XH),  (10) 
so XH is the industry's  capacity output.  The goods  supply  curve is then 
given  in Figure 1: it is decreasing  from p =  w/f(O)  at 0 output  to p =  w/ 
f(XH)  at capacity output,  and then has a vertical spike at capacity output. 
This industry  supply  curve can be interpreted  as the social average cost 
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wl  -  pf(X)l - 
SAC =  f(X) =  X  P  (11) 
The combination  of this industry  supply  curve with horizontal short run 
demand  is the source of equilibrium fluctuations  in this model. 
How  do we  interpret  our downward  sloping  industry  supply  curve? 
We stress  that we  do not literally believe  that technological  externalities 
are an important explanation  of cyclical fluctuations.  However,  the Mar- 
shallian externality formulation  can be thought  of as a reduced form for 
some  things  that  we  do  believe  to be  important,  and  discuss  at some 
length  in MSV88. The most  plausible  form of industry-wide  increasing 
returns probably has to do with "thick markets" externalities or with the 
closely  related  economies  of scale  in distribution.  When  the  output  in 
the industry is high,  there are many customers  in the market, and so the 
probability  of  a fast  match  between  the  seller  and  the  buyer  is  much 
higher. Because the selling  costs are a significant component  of the costs 
of making the final good,  and because  these costs plausibly fall when  the 
industry  rather  than  the  firm's  output  rises,  we  find  specification  (6) 
appealing.  In this respect,  the work most closely related to our specifica- 
tion is Diamond  (1982) and Howitt  and McAfee (1988). 
There  are several  industry  structures  that can be  thought  of in  this 
way.  For example,  our  supply  curve  can describe  an industry  such  as 
Figure  1 SUPPLY 
P 
XH  X 254 *  MURPHY,  SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
housing  in which  time to sale falls and therefore productivity rises when 
there  is  a lot  of  construction  and  many  consumers  are in the  market. 
Alternatively,  our supply  curve might be a reduced  form description  of 
an industry in which  specialized  supplies  are cheaper when  the industry 
is  humming  because  individual  suppliers  can  take advantage  of  their 
increasing  returns at the firm level.  Our supply  curve can also describe 
an industry  in which  there are increasing  returns in retailing. 
An  important  question  is  whether  our  downward  sloping  supply 
curve can describe an industry in which markets are perfectly organized, 
but individual  firms face increasing  returns in production.  Ramey (1987) 
finds that the industry  marginal cost curve for a number of manufactur- 
ing industries  is declining,  suggesting  that in fact one  can get industry 
increasing  returns purely  in production.  Ramey also surveys  a number 
of other empirical studies  documenting  declining industry marginal cost 
curves.  Hall  (1988a,c)  presents  evidence  for increasing  returns  at the 
industry  level,  although  his  evidence  pertains  to  decreasing  average 
rather than  marginal  cost.  As  we  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  the 
decreasing  average  cost  story typically yields  procyclical real wages  be- 
cause of countercyclical  markups and not because  of procyclical produc- 
tivity. It is thus a different story from the one we  tell. 
Despite  Ramey's and others' evidence  on declining  industry marginal 
cost, there are no good theoretical models  of such industries.  If an indus- 
try where  individual  firms have increasing returns in production adjusts 
to declines  in demand  by shutting  down  inefficient  plants,  then even  if 
each  plant  operates  subject  to  increasing  returns,  industry  returns  to 
scale are decreasing.  For increasing  returns in production  at the plant or 
firm level to translate into industry  increasing returns, an industry must 
contract in a recession  by keeping  most plants in operation and reducing 
the output  of each,  rather than by shutting  down  inefficient plants. This 
would  be  the  case  if,  for  example,  products  of  different  plants  were 
geographically  or  otherwise  highly  differentiated.  Contraction  of  all 
plants would  also result if different  firms in the industry  could not,  for 
competitive  reasons,  share  the  market in  a way  that enables  a few  to 
produce  at capacity  and  to take advantage  of increasing  returns.  Such 
firms would  rather keep their customers  and produce at a high marginal 
cost. However  one  thinks  of these  industries,  they must have the prop- 
erty that most firms and indeed  most plants are marginal and so increas- 
ing  returns  at  the  plant  level  translate  into  increasing  returns  at  the 
industry  level.  Since  our  paper  focuses  on  the  structure of  increasing 
returns models,  we  treat (6) as a primitive assumption  and do not pur- 
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2.2 EQUILIBRIA 
An equilibrium in this model  is a path of output  X(t), durable stock S(t), 
wage  w(t) and price p(t) such  that all markets clear. Note  that as long as 
(5) holds,  the consumer  is on his labor supply  curve. 
To make the model  interesting,  we  assume  that the long-run  demand 
curve D(X) cuts  the downward  sloping  segment  of the supply  curve.  If 
D(X)  cuts  the  supply  curve  at  capacity,  the  equilibrium  is  the  trivial 
outcome  in which  all firms produce at capacity all the time. In MSV88 we 
show  that  if building  capacity  is  sufficiently  cheap  relative  to the  cost 
saving from operating at a higher output,  firms will always build enough 
capacity  so  that  long  run  demand  curve  cuts  the  downward  sloping 
segment  of the supply  curve. 
This model has a variety of cyclical equilibria, which take the following 
form. Over some  period  of time,  the economy  produces  at capacity XH, 
the stock of durables grows,  and the rental rate on durables falls. During 
initial stages  of this  period,  people's  willingness  to work for goods  de- 
clines since their consumption  rises, and so the price of goods  falls while 
real wages  rise. Toward the end of the high production  period,  the price 
of goods  actually  rises in the anticipation  of lean times and high  rental 
rates  in  the  future.  Eventually  the  boom  ends,  and  the  economy 
switches  to  zero  output,  again  maintained  over  some  period  of  time. 
During this period,  the stock of durables depreciates  and the rental rate 
rises. As consumption  falls over this period,  the willingness  of people  to 
work  for goods  rises,  and  at least  at the  initial stages  of the  recession 
prices rise and real wages  fall. Toward the end of the recession,  we again 
get  the  effect  that prices  fall because  people  know  that good  times  are 
coming  and with  them low rental rates. 
This  business  cycle  can  be  easily  thought  of  in  terms  of  Figure  2. 
During the boom,  the economy  operates  on the vertical segment  of the 
supply  curve.  As  the  boom  continues,  the  demand  curve  essentially 
slides  down  the vertical segment  of the supply  curve, because  the will- 
ingness  to work diminishes  (again, the demand  curve moves  up shortly 
before  the  boom  ends).  At  some  point,  the  economy  switches  to zero 
output,  and at the initial stages of the boom the demand curve is moving 
up.  Eventually,  the  economy  goes  back  to  the  high  production  level. 
Figure  3  describes  the  behavior  of  the  capital  stock,  prices,  and  real 
wages  over the business  cycle. 
The  period  of  these  cycles  can  be  very  short,  where  the  economy 
"chatters" between  high  and low  output,  or much longer. In the longer 
cycles,  the  sector  gets  stuck  at  a  high  or low  output  level  because  a 256 *  MURPHY, SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
coordinated  change  in output  by many  firms is required to change  each 
firm's productivity  and prices. The Marshallian externality in the produc- 
tion function  is the source of this coordination  failure. The coordination 
failure is crucial to the model,  since without  it the economy  would fluctu- 
Figure  2 EQUILIBRIUM 
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ate at a very high  frequency,  and there would  be no hope  of explaining 
low  frequency  business  cycle  fluctuations.  Although  many  cycles  are 
sustainable,  constant  output  is not  sustainable  as an equilibrium,  since 
in  this  case  any  firm raising  its  output  would  bring other  firms to do 
likewise  and thus destroy  the equilibrium. 
An interesting  property  of this model  is that it has the cycle of long- 
est  possible  duration,  for  reasons  detailed  by  Mitchell  (1927).  In this 
cycle, the price of durables reaches its minimum  and maximum sustain- 
able values.  The longest  cycle has the property  that both  the recession 
and the boom  last as long as they possibly  can in a cyclical equilibrium. 
If the boom  were  to last any longer,  the rental rates would  get to be so 
low  that  at  some  point  prior  to  the  end  of  the  boom  the  price  of 
durables  would  have  to fall below  production  cost even  when  the  sec- 
tor is operating  at maximum  efficiency.  Because  this cannot  happen  in 
equilibrium,  there  is  a natural  end  to  the  boom,  where  people  get  so 
satiated  with  durables  that  they  would  rather take leisure  than  work 
even  at a high  productivity.  In terms of Figure 2, the longest  boom  can 
be thought  of as the demand  curve falling off the cliff at XH.  Similarly, if 
the recession  were  to last any longer,  at some  point prior to its end  the 
prices of durables would  get so high that even  one firm operating alone 
at a low  productivity  can  make  money  by  producing.  This  of  course 
cannot  happen  in equilibrium.  This natural end  to the recession  means 
that  people  eventually  want  goods  so  much  that  they  are willing  to 
work at low  productivity  to get goods  rather than consume  leisure.  The 
longest  cycle  is  a  form  of  long-run  stability  in  this  economy,  which 
arises because  the long-run  demand  curve for goods  is steeper  than the 
long-run  supply  curve. 
The  welfare  properties  of  the  equilibria in  this  model  can be  easily 
summarized.  First, at least  some  output  fluctuations  are efficient.  It is 
efficient  for this  sector  to  take advantage  of increasing  returns  and  to 
produce  some  of the  time  and  rest the remainder  of the time.  Second, 
most  equilibrium  fluctuations  are not  efficient.  This inefficiency  is  re- 
flected in the fact that the period of the cycle is too long,  which  leads to 
excessive  variability of consumption.  The inefficiency  is also reflected in 
the fact that, for a cycle of a fixed period,  recessions  last too long relative 
to booms,  leading  to too low  an average  level of consumption.  The main 
reason  for the  latter inefficiency  is the  Marshallian externality  and  the 
resulting coordination  problem,  that prevents  firms from spending  more 
time  operating  at  capacity.  The  model  shows  that  even  in  the  world 
where  fluctuations  of  output  are efficient,  equilibrium  business  cycles 
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2.3 A COMPARISON  OF THE  IR  MODEL  WITH  THE  TS MODEL 
Similarities:  There are a significant  number  of similarities between  the 
IR model  described  above  and  the  TS model.  Most  obviously,  fluctua- 
tions  in both  models  are driven  by productivity  movements.  In the TS 
model,  such movements  result from exogenous  technological  shocks.  In 
the  IR model,  they  result  from endogenous  movements  along  the  in- 
creasing returns production  function.  The consequence  of either assump- 
tion, however,  is that business  cycles are associated  with movements  in 
true, rather than just measured,  productivity. 
A  key  feature  of  our  model  is  durability  of  the  good,  that leads  to 
extremely  elastic  short-run  demand  and  instability.  As  a  result,  the 
model  generates  large  output  fluctuations  even  with  small  increasing 
returns.  TS models  have  not  stressed  durable  consumption  goods,  al- 
though  they  do  emphasize  the  durable nature of capital. The large re- 
sponsiveness  of investment  to small changes  in productivity is an impor- 
tant element  of the Kydland/Prescott  and Prescott models  as well. 
An appealing  feature of our model,  that can be easily worked into a TS 
model,  is the natural limit on the length of booms and recessions.  Propo- 
nents  of the TS view  rarely talk about business  cycles per se, and so this 
issue  of  mean  reversion  does  not  arise.  However,  the  effect  we  are 
talking about would  appear in a TS model  also.  Even if the economy  is 
subjected  to a sequence  of fairly persistent  adverse  technology  shocks, 
eventually  it would  pay to work and to produce even if opportunities  are 
poor, provided  that people  are hungry enough  for goods.  Such long-run 
stability would  thus appear in a TS model  as well. 
Differences:  Here  we  note  four differences  between  1-sector IR and TS 
models,  other than the source  of productivity  movements.  First, the IR 
model  is  an endogenous business  cycle  model,  and  the  TS model  is an 
exogenous shocks  model.  To the extent  that we  have  trouble identifying 
technology  shocks,  particularly the  bad ones  that cause  recessions,  an 
endogenous  business  cycle model  seems  more attractive. Moreover, we 
find the importance  of self-fulfilling  expectations  an attractive feature of 
the IR models. 
Second,  most  technology  shocks  are likely  to be persistent,  whereas 
periods  of production  at high  capacity in IR models  are temporary. Be- 
cause  Prescott  (1986) assumes  highly  persistent  shocks,  the  ability  of 
agents  to  engage  in  intertemporal  substitution  is  limited.  Hence,  in- 
tertemporal  substitution  must  be very  high  to rationalize  the observed 
movements  as an equilibrium response  to permanent shocks. In contrast, 
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much less intertemporal  substitution  to induce agents to respond to peri- 
ods of high productivity  with increased labor supply. Since intertemporal 
substitutability  needed  to calibrate TS models  is extremely large, the fact 
that IR models  need  much less of such substitutability is attractive. 
Third,  IR and  TS models  have  different  implications  about  the  re- 
sponse  of labor productivity  to demand  shocks.  Kydland/Prescott  pre- 
dict that, holding  technology  constant,  labor productivity should fall and 
certainly not rise in response  to a demand  shock because of diminishing 
returns.  In  contrast,  our  model  predicts  that  a  demand  shock  could 
switch  the  economy  to  a high  output  level,  and  so  raise productivity 
because  of increasing  returns. 
Consistent  with the last prediction,  Hall (1988c), using instruments  for 
demand  disturbances,  finds  that  demand  shocks  positively  affect  the 
Solow  residual.  The  appropriateness  of  Hall's  instruments,  which  in- 
clude most notably the price of oil, has been questioned.  His results can 
also be explained  by unobserved  procyclical work effort. If Hall's results 
stand up to scrutiny, however,  they provide  strong evidence  against TS 
models.  In an observation  similar to Hall's,  Mankiw  (1987) points  out 
that measured  labor productivity  rose in World War II, at the time of a 
sharp increase in the government's  purchases  of durables. One explana- 
tion of Mankiw's  result is increasing  returns, although  there are others, 
including  the increased  war effort. 
A final distinction  between  the simple IR and the simple TS models  is 
in the treatment  of welfare  consequences  of fluctuations.  Our IR model 
suggests  that the  efficiency  cost  of most  business  cycles  is small,  since 
consumption  of durables varies a lot less than do purchases.  Empirically, 
we  may  not  be  too  far from  Prescott's  (1986) conclusion  that business 
cycles are efficient.  Nonetheless,  it seems  obvious  that neither TS nor IR 
models  have  yet  dealt  with  important  costs  of  business  fluctuations, 
such  as  unequal  distribution  of  the  burden  of  the  recessions  or their 
excessive  duration  because  of more  fundamental  problems,  such  as fi- 
nancial collapse.  It is fair to say that neither approach has seriously dealt 
with policy. 
We can summarize  this section by stressing  that both models  are simi- 
lar in that fluctuations  are driven  by movements  in labor productivity. 
Both models  are significantly  more plausible when  they stress durability 
of goods  as a way to generate  large output responses  to small productiv- 
ity changes.  The increasing  returns model  has the additional advantage 
of being supported  by independent  evidence  (Ramey 1987; Hall 1988a,c). 
In the next few  sections,  we  describe in more detail some  of the ways  to 
augment  both  the  standard  TS model  and  our IR model  to make them 
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3. Co-movement  of Outputs  and  Labor  Inputs  Between  Sectors 
3.1 THE  EVIDENCE  AND THE  PROBLEM 
The previous  section  has presented  a 1-sector IR model  of the business 
cycle and compared  it to a 1-sector TS model.  One sector models  do not, 
however,  address  the  question  of  co-movement  of  outputs  and  labor 
inputs  across  sectors  during  the business  cycle.  In this section,  we  first 
discuss  the fact that such co-movement  is extremely pronounced,  and is 
clearly one of the crucial stylized  facts that a business  cycle model should 
explain. We then suggest  that the Prescott (1986) and Long/Plosser (1983) 
models  do not adequately  explain why outputs and labor inputs in differ- 
ent sectors move  together.  Finally, we present an alternative approach to 
co-movement,  based  on  immobile  (specialized)  labor  and  imperfect 
credit. 
Table 1 presents  the evidence  on annual correlation of growth rates of 
different  sectors  of  the  economy  during  1947-87.  Panel A  focuses  on 
annual growth  rates of real output,  and panel B presents  data on annual 
growth  rates  of  employment.  Table 1 also  includes  correlations  with 
changes  in  detrended  employment  rate-described  in  more  detail  in 
Section 5-which  is our preferred business  cycle indicator. 
Table 1 shows  extremely  high  correlations  of  output  growth  across 
sectors,  as  well  as  high  correlations  of  sectoral  growth  rates with  the 
business  cycle indicator. Most strikingly, the correlation of growth rate of 
durables with  the growth  rate of GDP is .95, and with the change in the 
detrended  employment  rate it is .92. Growth rates of output in construc- 
tion,  nondurables,  and  even  trade are also extremely  highly  correlated 
with the GDP growth  rate, the cyclical indicator, and each other. Mining 
co-moves  somewhat  less,  in part because  there is a sharp change  in the 
trend  growth  rate  of  mining  over  this  period.  Even  government  and 
finance  seem  to move  in step  with  other sectors.  In fact, there is not a 
single  negative  coefficient  in panel A of Table 1. It is very much the case 
in these  data that outputs  in broadly defined  sectors move  together and 
procyclically. 
A  similar  picture  emerges  for  labor  inputs  in  panel  B of  Table  1. 
Growth  rates  of  labor inputs  are highly  correlated across  sectors,  and 
with  the cyclical indicator.  Durables  again lead the pack, showing  a .95 
correlation with  the growth  rate of total employment,  and a .93 correla- 
tion with  the changes  in the cyclical variable. There are a few  negative 
correlations of employment  growth  rates, such as between  government 
and trade and  government  and  services,  but by and large employment 
growth  rates behave  like output  growth  rates. In fact, the extent  of co- 
movement  in  labor inputs  between  durables,  non-durables,  construc- Table 1  CORRELATIONS OF GROWTH RATES ACROSS SECTORS ANNUAL  1947-87 
Con-  Trans-  Detrended 
struc-  Dur-  porta-  Ser-  Employment 
All  Mining  tion  ables  Non-durables  Trade  tion  vices  Gov't  Finance  Rate 
Panel A: Correlations  of Output  Growth  Rates 
All  1.00 
Mining  .32 
Construction  .76 
Durables  .95 
Non-durables  .89 
Trade  .89 
Transportation  .92 
Services  .72 
Government  .34 
Finance  .54 
Detrended  Em-  .93 












.69  1.00 
.72  .91 
.75  .76 
.67  .83 
.42  .54 
.20  .30 
.67  .40 









.84  1.00 
.74  .74  1.00 
.23  .25  .15  1.00 
.58  .58  .54  .03  1.00 
.83  .81  .64  .22  .47 
Panel B: Correlations  of Employment  Growth  Rates 
All  1.00 
Mining  .63 
Construction  .67 
Durables  .95 
Non-durables  .76 
Trade  .71 
Transportation  .77 
Services  .54 
Government  .48 
Finance  .60 
Detrended  Em-  .89 












.62  1.00 
.59  .73 
.52  .76 
.32  .78 
.33  .61 
.20  .28 
.61  .53 









.54  1.00 
.56  .68  1.00 
-.09  .28  -.13  1.00 
.48  .43  .29  .22  1.00 
.65  .81  .68  .33  .52 
1.00 
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tion,  and  trade  is  quite  remarkable-and  those  are the  sectors  across 
which  labor is potentially  mobile. 
One  question  Table 1 does  not  address  is whether  co-movement  be- 
tween  sectors is just a reflection of trend growth rates in the economy,  or 
whether  it reflects shorter-run cyclical fluctuation  of sectors.  To address 
this  issue,  Table 2 presents  partial correlations  of output  and  employ- 
ment  growth  rates controlling  for business  cycle  movements.  In these 
partial correlations,  the business  cycle control is our detrended  employ- 
ment  growth  rate.  Large  residual  correlations  would  be  evidence  of 
strong non-cyclical  co-movement,  which  can just reflect the growth rate 
of the economy. 
The  partial  correlation  coefficients  in  Table 2  are  obviously  much 
smaller than those  in Table 1, and many of them are negative.  For exam- 
ple,  the  residual  correlation  of  growth  rates  of  durables  and  non- 
durables  is  .50,  compared  to the  correlation  of  .91 in Table 1, and  the 
residual correlation of durables and construction  is .26 to the correlation 
of  .69 in  Table 1.  Similarly, the  residual  correlation of  growth  rates of 
durable and non-durable  employment  is .53, compared to the raw corre- 
lation of .73, and the residual correlation of growth rates of employment 
in durables and construction  is -.20,  compared to the raw correlation of 
.62. In fact, the average  difference  between  the total correlation of sec- 
toral output  growth  rates with  GDP growth  and the residual correlation 
of these  two  variables  is  .28.  Similarly, the  average  difference  between 
the  total  correlation  of  sectoral  employment  growth  rates  with  GDP 
growth  rate and  the  residual  correlation  is  .24.  These  results  demon- 
strate quite  convincingly  that  cyclical co-movement  of growth  rates of 
output  and  employment  across  sectors  qualifies  as a bona fide stylized 
fact of business  cycle analysis. 
Theoretically,  generating  such  strong  positive  co-movements  of out- 
puts and labor inputs  from sectoral productivity  changes  is not easy. To 
see the problem,  suppose  that sector A is operating at a high level with 
an increasing returns technology,  or has a good technology  shock. Either 
way,  productivity  and wages  in sector A are high,  and so,  with  a posi- 
tively  sloped  labor supply  curve,  labor input  in sector A rises.  If other 
sectors  do  not  also  experience  a productivity  improvement,  and if the 
output  of sector A is not complementary  in consumption  or production 
with  the outputs  of these  other sectors,  labor should  move  out of these 
sectors and into  sector A,  resulting  in a negative  co-movement  of labor 
inputs  across  sectors.  Unless  the good  productivity  shock is pervasive, 
so  that  the  only  sector  that  shrinks  is  leisure,  this  model  has  trouble 
explaining  co-movement  of labor inputs. 
This  problem  is  troubling  for both  Prescott's  (1986) and  Long  and Table 2  PARTIAL CORRELATIONS OF OUTPUT AND  EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES ACROSS INDUSTRIES 
AFTER CONTROLLING FOR BUSINESS CYCLE VARIATION* 
Construc-  Non-  Transpor- 
All  Mining  tion  Durables  durables  Trade  tation  Services  Gov't  Finance 












.28  1.00 
.42  .03  1.00 
.69  .10  .26 
.55  .12  .35 
.17  .32  -.32 
.38  -.10  .23 
-.19  -.11  -.11 
.42  .11  .01 
.35  .09  .44 
1.00 
.50  1.00 
.10  .26  1.00 
.54  .50  .03  1.00 
-.08  .15  .30  .22  1.00 
-.09  -.19  .01  -.43  -.52  1.00 
.16  .21  .02  .22  -.10  .06  1.00 












.49  1.00 
.05  -.13  1.00 
.63  .33  -.20 
.35  .00  .01 
.80  .66  .06 
.60  .31  .24 
.45  .32  -.21 
.39  .02  .04 
.34  -.02  .57 
1.00 
.53  1.00 
.39  .07  1.00 
-.01  .06  .51 
-.15  -.10  .49 
.24  .11  .13 






.02  1.00 
.35  -.09  1.00 
*Partial  correlations  are conditional  on detrended unemployment  rate  changes as defined in the text. 264 *  MURPHY,  SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
Plosser's  (1983) approaches.  As has been  pointed  out independently  by 
Benhabib, Rogerson,  and Wright (1988), Prescott's (1986) model predicts 
a negative  co-movement  of labor inputs  between  consumption  and in- 
vestment  sectors.  Prescott  does  not  distinguish  between  consumption 
and investment  sectors,  but we  in fact can think of the  two  sectors  as 
separate  but  having  identical  production  functions.  Prescott calibrates 
his model  by noting  that, in the long  run, labor input does  not rise and 
maybe  even  declines  with  increases  in  productivity.  This  means  that, 
within  the consumption  sector, the income  effect is at least as strong as 
the substitution  effect. The implication of this assumption  is that employ- 
ment in the consumption  sector does  not rise, and possibly  shrinks,  in 
response  to a good  productivity  shock  to that sector. From the point  of 
view  of employment  in the consumption  sector, we  can therefore think 
of shocks in this model  as being  only to the investment  good  sector. 
Suppose  there is a good  productivity  shock to the investment  sector. 
In response  to this attractive temporary opportunity,  labor input  in the 
investment  sector rises, raising the marginal utility of leisure. Calibration 
says that holding  the labor input in the investment  sector constant,  labor 
input  in the  consumption  sector is independent  of productivity  in the 
consumption  sector.  Hence,  since  labor input  in the investment  sector 
rises,  we  should  get a fall in the labor input in the consumption  sector. 
The Prescott (1986) model thus predicts, counterfactually, countercyclical 
labor input in the consumption  sector. This result is much more general 
than Prescott's  (1986) specific model;  details are available from us upon 
request. 
A  similar problem  would  arise in Long  and  Plosser's  model,  except 
they assume  unit elastic demand  for leisure.  As a result of this assump- 
tion,  labor inputs  do  not  change  over  the  cycle  in  their  model:  their 
model generates  co-movement  in outputs  at constant labor inputs.  If LP 
instead  assumed  a  more  conventional  positively  sloped  labor supply, 
they would  get a negative co-movement  of labor inputs  between  sectors 
at the  time  productivity  shocks  hit.  An  increase  in productivity  in one 
sector raises the real wage  and draws labor into that sector out of other 
sectors as well as out of leisure.  Long and Plosser can still get a positive 
co-movement  of final outputs  by the time shocks propagate through the 
input-output  matrix.  As  we  show  in  Section  5,  however,  this  story  is 
inconsistent  with relative price evidence. 
In the rest of this section,  we offer a solution to this problem, based on 
the idea  that,  first,  labor is  specialized  and  immobile  between  sectors, 
and,  second,  there are borrowing  constraints.  In practical terms, immo- 
bile  labor means  that  people  have  a strong  comparative  advantage  at 
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into  whatever  sector  is productive  at the  moment.  This assumption  is 
perfectly  consistent  with  large  gross  labor flows  in  the  economy,  and 
with a high level  of mobility of some  segments  of the labor force. It only 
says that, for many  workers,  it is better to work in their own  sector and 
to exchange  the  output  for other  goods  than  always  to move  into  the 
most productive  sector. Immobile labor creates a need for people  to trade 
the goods  they  produce,  rather than working  in each sector to produce 
the good  for their own  consumption. 
This need  to trade when  labor is immobile is an important component 
of the  story explaining  co-movement.  Consider  first the case of mobile 
labor.  When  sector  A  is  productive,  and  labor is  mobile,  it  pays  all 
workers to come work in sector A to buy sector A's good,  which  is now 
particularly cheap.  Unless  some  other  goods  are complements  to A- 
which  we  assume  they  are not-the  tradeoff between  leisure and work 
in  other  sectors  has  not  changed.  In  this  case,  workers  should  both 
consume  less leisure and work less in other sectors. 
Suppose,  in contrast,  that outside  workers are not trained to work in 
sector  A,  so  that  the  increase  in  sector A's  labor input  comes  entirely 
from the reduction  in leisure  of its own  workers.  Good A is still cheap, 
and  so  outside  workers  want  to  spend  more  on  it if demand  for A is 
elastic. To do that, they  must work more in their own  sectors,  and then 
spend  more  on  good  A.  This  leads  to  increased  labor input  in  other 
sectors,  and  a  positive  co-movement  of  labor  inputs  across  sectors. 
Alternatively,  workers  from outside  sector A can borrow and buy more 
of  good  A  now,  working  slightly  more  today  and  in  all  the  future 
periods  to repay their debts.  If workers  can easily borrow, there would 
be  some  but  not  much  co-movement.  Generating  significant  co-move- 
ment  between  sectors  requires both  immobile  labor and restricted bor- 
rowing  opportunities. 
In  the  next  subsection,  we  present  the  immobile  labor  argument 
formally using  a 1-period TS model.  Subsection  C summarizes  the argu- 
ments  in MSV88 that use  these  ideas  in an IR model.  Our theory of co- 
movement  illustrates  the importance  of trade, as opposed  to Robinson 
Crusoe,  for  understanding  fluctuations.  We  show  at  the  end  of  this 
section  that  several  earlier papers  have  made  assumptions  amounting 
essentially  to immobile  labor. 
3.2 A FORMAL  TS MODEL 
This section  presents  a one-period  competitive  RBC model with techno- 
logical shocks.  There is a unit interval of small sectors,  each producing 
its own  good,  s. There is also a unit measure  of consumers.  The utility 
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c()  ds -L,  (12) 
where c(s) is consumption  of good  s and L is labor. We assume  that f  -  1 
and 0 -  1. For consistency  of the model,  we also assume  that  3 -2  >  0. 
In this model,  the case of 0 >  1 corresponds  to elastic demand  for goods 
and upward  sloping  labor supply. The substitution  effect in the demand 
for goods  is stronger than the income  effect. In contrast, when  0 < 0, the 
income  effect  is  stronger,  the  demand  for goods  is inelastic,  and labor 
supply  is backward bending.  Naturally, the case of 0 > 0 is more plausi- 
ble  for durables.  Also  note  that /3 =  1 corresponds  to no  diminishing 
marginal  utility  of  leisure  and  0  =  0  to  the  Long/Plosser  case  of  unit 
elastic demand  for goods  and therefore for leisure. 
The production  function  of good  s is given by 
y(s) =  y(s)L(s),  (13) 
where  y(s) is technological  shock and L(s) is labor input in sector s. Each 
good  is produced  competitively  in its own  sector. 
Consider  first  this  model  with  mobile  labor,  so  there  is  actually  a 
representative  consumer  we  can  talk  about.  This  consumer's  budget 
constraint is given  by 
f c(s)p(s)ds =  Lw.  (14) 
Market clearing  requires  that c(s) =  y(s) for all s, and competition  says 
that y(s)p(s) =  w. We can let the wage  be numeraire: w =  1. 
This model  can be  solved  for consumption  of each good  s and  labor 
input in each sector s as a function  of technological  shocks in all sectors: 
c(s) = y(s)'-  [f(s')-  ds']-  (15) 
L(s) =  y(s)-  [f y(s')-  ds']P-  0  (16) 
Several observations  can be made about these  solutions. 
First, consumption  of good  s always increases in y(s). This is because a 
good  productivity  shock always  reduces  the relative price of good s, and 
since s is normal, its consumption  rises. Second,  when  0 > 0, labor input 
in sector s rises with  the technology  shock,  and when  0 <  0, labor input 
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mand  for good  s,  so when  the  price of good  s falls,  demand  for s rises 
more than the increase in output due to the productivity increase, and so 
employment  rises.  Conversely,  when  0 <  0, the  demand  for good  s is 
inelastic,  and  so a rise in productivity  leads  to a less  than proportional 
increase in the quantity consumed,  and so a reduction in the labor input. 
The case of 0 >  0 corresponds  to durable goods,  and so both labor and 
output should  probably rise when  a sector experiences  a positive produc- 
tivity shock. 
More interesting  results  concern  co-movement  of outputs  and  labor 
inputs  across  sectors.  When  3 =  1, (15) and  (16) show  that all sectors 
move  by themselves,  without  any influence  from other sectors,  as one 
would  expect  in  the  case  of  separability  of  goods  and  no  increasing 
disutility  of work.  The same  result obtains in the Long/Plosser  case of 0 
= 0, where  labor inputs  in different sectors are fixed, and outputs  move 
proportionately  with  productivity  because  of unit  elastic  demand.  Ex- 
cept  for these  two  cases,  however,  labor always  negatively  co-moves 
between  sectors.  When  0 >  0,  a good  productivity  shock  in  sector  s' 
raises demand  for labor in s', and so, since the tradeoff between  employ- 
ment  in sector s and leisure  has not changed,  there will be a reduction 
both in leisure and in employment  in s. When 0 < 0, a good productivity 
shock to s' reduces  labor input in s' because  of inelastic demand  for this 
good,  and so labor moves  both into leisure and into sector s. This case, of 
course,  is blatantly inconsistent  with  the evidence.  In either case,  labor 
inputs  in s and in s' move  in opposite  directions,  contrary to what hap- 
pens  over a business  cycle. 
Furthermore,  output  negatively  co-moves  in the plausible case of 0 > 
0, and positively  co-moves  with  0 <  0. When  0 >  0, a good  shock in s' 
raises  employment  and  output  in  s' but  cuts  employment  in s,  as we 
mentioned  earlier. Because productivity  in sector s is unchanged,  output 
of  good  s  must  also  fall.  Output  in  s  and  s'  thus  move  in  opposite 
directions.  When  0 <  0,  a good  shock  in s' raises  output  but  reduces 
employment  in s'. Because  labor moves  into sector s, both employment 
and output  in sector s rise. This leads to co-movement  of outputs.  In the 
case of mobile labor, we thus get two unrealistic results: employment  co- 
moves  negatively,  and output  co-moves  negatively  in the plausible  case 
of upward  sloping  labor supply.  Long and Plosser do not get the latter 
result because,  in their model,  shocks  are to common  intermediate  in- 
puts and so are correlated. 
Consider  next  the  more  interesting  case  of immobile  labor, where  a 
worker can only  work in one  sector or consume  leisure.  We assume  the 
same preferences  as before,  and the same number of workers per sector. 268 *  MURPHY,  SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
Let c(s,s') be consumption  of good  s by a worker in sector s'. The budget 
constraint of worker s' now  takes the form: 
f c(s,s')p(s)ds =  L(s')w(s')  (17) 
for all s'. Competition  now  does  not restrict wages  to be the same in all 
sectors: 
y(s)p(s) = w(s)  (18) 
for all s. Finally, market clearing takes the form 
f c(s,s')ds =  y(s)L(s)  (19) 
for all s. For our purposes,  we  do not need  to choose  a numeraire. 
A considerable  amount  of grinding  leads to the following  closed form 
solution  to this model: 
(3- 0) 
w(s)  =  y(s)  -  2  (20) 
P8(o-1) 
p(s)  =  y(s)  p2  (21) 
c(s,s')  =  y(s')-  2 * y(s)p-2  [fy(s*)p-  2 ds*] -P  (22) 
02  1M0  1-  0 
L(s') =  y(s')  -82 [f y(s*)p  -o  ds*] :.  (23) 
Using  (22)-(23),  we  can ask the  same  questions  as we  did with  mobile 
labor. 
Similar to  the  case  with  mobile  labor,  consumption  of  good  s by  a 
worker in sector s' increases both in the shock to sector s and in the shock 
to sector s'. But there are some  crucial differences.  First, because  of the 
symmetry assumption,  labor input in sectors always rises with productiv- 
ity in that sector, whether  or not 0 is positive.  When  0 >  0, demand  for 
good s is elastic. At the same labor input as before the shock, the price of 
good  s  declines  less  than  productivity  rises,  so  that  the  real wage  in 
sector s rises. Since labor supply  is upward sloping  for 0 >  0, labor input 
rises in response  to the increase in the real wage.  In contrast, when  0 < 
0, demand  for good s is inelastic.  When y(s) rises, p(s) falls more than the 
productivity  increase,  and  so  the  real wage  in  sector s falls.  But labor 
supply  slopes  down  for 0 <  0, and so labor input rises in response  to the 
fall in the real wage.  Independent  of the value of 0, labor input in sector s 
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The most  interesting  results  again concern  co-movement  of labor in- 
puts  and  of consumption.  In this model,  we  get co-movement  of labor 
inputs  as long  as  0 >  0. When  productivity  y(s') in sector s' rises,  p(s') 
falls, which  raises the real wages  of workers in all other sectors. With 0 > 
0, labor supply  in these  sectors slopes  up and so workers there all work 
more. Conversely,  with  0 <  0, labor supply  slopes  down  and labor input 
in sector s falls in response  to a rise in y(s'). As long as workers want to 
work more when  their real wage  rises,  they respond  to a lower price in 
another  sector by producing  more of their own  good,  and trading it for 
the productive  sector's output. 
Co-movement  of  consumption,  like co-movement  of labor, depends 
on the sign  of 0. When  sector s experiences  a good  productivity  shock, 
p(s) falls and  real wages  in all sectors  rise.  When  0 >  0, workers  in all 
sectors want to work more and to buy more of all goods,  so consumption 
of all goods  rises.  In contrast,  when  0 <  0, the response  to a rise in real 
wages  from a fall in p(s) is to work less,  so hours and consumption  of all 
goods  other than good  s fall. Consumption  of different goods  co-moves, 
therefore,  as long  as labor supply  slopes  up. 
The  results  for  mobile  and  immobile  labor are very  different.  With 
mobile  labor,  employment  always  co-moves  negatively  across  sectors, 
and consumption  co-moves  only if 0 <  0. With immobile labor, employ- 
ment  and consumption  both co-move  for 0 >  0 and not otherwise.  The 
reason  for the difference  is that with  mobile labor, one  can get more of 
another good  by working  in the sector in which  it is produced,  whereas 
with immobile  labor one has to work in one's  own  sector and trade. For 
durables,  the  case  of  elastic  demand  (and  therefore  positively  sloped 
labor supply)  is the empirically correct one.  Since in this case the model 
clearly generates  empirically  correct predictions  about co-movement  of 
labor inputs  and  consumption  over  the business  cycle,  the case for as- 
suming  specialization  and immobile  labor seems  to be compelling. 
Because our model  assumes  identical demand  elasticities for different 
goods,  it does  not deal with  Prescott's case.  We have looked  at a model 
where  0 =  0 for one  good,  and  0 >  0 for another. In such a model,  one 
indeed  gets  a negative  co-movement  of labor inputs  with  mobile labor, 
and a positive  co-movement  with immobile  labor. 
So far we have presented  a one period model,  and have not addressed 
the  issue  of  credit.  If we  think  of  some  of  the  goods  in our model  as 
future consumption  goods,  the credit point is apparent.  Even if labor is 
immobile,  an  increase  in  productivity  and  the  resulting  decline  in  the 
price of good  s is likely to lead to only  a small increase in today's  labor 
input  in other sectors.  Instead  of working  much harder today, a worker 
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and repay the loan by raising his labor supply  today and in all the future 
periods  by  a  small  amount.  To generate  a  significant  amount  of  co- 
movement  between  sectors,  both  immobile  labor and  imperfect  credit 
are required. 
The role we  have assigned  to imperfect credit here is different from- 
and  complementary  to-that  in  other  recent  models  (Bernanke  and 
Gertler 1989; Greenwald  and Stiglitz 1987). In those models,  a bad shock 
reduces  the  internal  availability  of funds  to a firm, which  then  has  to 
reduce its investment  because  of the credit constraint.  The reduction  in 
investment  in  turn  leads  to  lower  output  and  therefore  a persistently 
lower availability of funds in the future. Importantly, this is basically a 1- 
sector  (or one-firm)  story  of the  role of credit.  In contrast,  here and in 
MSV88 credit  serves  to  facilitate  intertemporal  trade between  sectors. 
When credit markets are imperfect,  such trade is less attractive, leading 
agents  in different  sectors  of the economy  to synchronize  their produc- 
tion periods  so they can trade instantaneously  and economize  on credit. 
In this  sense,  imperfect  credit  in  our  model  serves  to concentrate  the 
effects of shock at a point in time rather than to spread them over time. 
We believe  that both  consequences  of imperfect  credit are important in 
practice. In fact, it may be possible  to combine  the Greenwald-Stiglitz- 
Bernanke-Gertler view  of countercyclical  costs  of credit with  some  fea- 
tures  of our model,  such  as immobile  labor, durables  and elastic labor 
supply,  to  generate  self-fulfilling  fluctuations  even  in  the  absence  of 
increasing  returns at the sectoral level. 
3.3 CO-MOVEMENT  IN A MODEL  WITH  INCREASING  RETURNS 
So far, we have considered  the co-movement  issue in a TS model,  where 
it is simpler  to see.  Identical arguments  apply  also in a variant of an IR 
model of Section 2, and are developed  in MSV88. The question  in the IR 
model  is: why  wouldn't  different  sectors  of  the  economy  cycle  out  of 
sync  with  each  other,  especially  if there  is an aggregate  resource  con- 
straint? If they do cycle out of sync,  aggregate  output would  be smooth, 
and we would  not observe  aggregate  fluctuations. 
In MSV88, we  show  that aggregate  fluctuations  obtain when  labor is 
immobile  and  borrowing  is constrained.  In this  case,  when  a sector is 
productive  and its output is cheap,  the only way workers in other sectors 
can take advantage  of low  prices is by working  themselves  and trading 
their output for the productive  sector's output.  In equilibrium, all sectors 
fluctuate together.  As in a TS model,  aggregate  fluctuations  obtain with 
immobile  labor and restricted borrowing  in an IR model. 
The notion of immobile  labor has appeared in a number of recent mod- 
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Roberts (1987) assume  either  that workers  are specialists  in production 
and generalists  in consumption,  or that they  cannot consume  the good 
that they produce.  The power of this assumption  is always to make trades 
necessary  for consumption  and  to preclude  the possibility  that people, 
like  Robinson  Crusoe,  simply  toil  to  produce  their own  consumption 
good.  The  point  that MSV88 and  the  current paper  emphasize  is that 
these  assumptions  can be used  to explain the observed  co-movement  of 
outputs  and  of labor inputs  across  sectors  in a wide  range  of models. 
Specialization  does  not just generate  "Keynesian" results, but also yields 
empirically correct predictions  about co-movement-even  in a TS model. 
There is nothing  intrinsically Keynesian  about specialization.1 
4. Elastic  Labor  Supply 
4.1 THE  NEED  FOR  ASSUMING  ELASTIC  LABOR  SUPPLY 
Recent empirical  research  (Bils 1985; Kydland  and Prescott  1987; Solon 
and Barsky 1988) finds that real wages  move  procyclically over the busi- 
ness  cycle,  but only mildly  so. At the same time, to generate large labor 
supply  movements  from  small  changes  in  real  wages,  one  needs  to 
assume  that  the  intertemporal  or lifetime  elasticity  of  labor supply  is 
much  higher.  For example,  Prescott  (1986) takes  this elasticity  to be 2, 
and still predicts  too-low  fluctuations  in hours. 
Even if one believes  that real wages  are installment  payments  that do 
not  reflect underlying  productivity,  and  do  not  really serve  to allocate 
labor over the business  cycle,  one still needs  a fairly elastic labor supply. 
The effects  of both  technology  shocks  and  increasing  returns over  the 
business  cycle  are probably  small  quantitatively.  To get  large  efficient 
movements  in the labor input in response  to such small changes  in tech- 
nology  requires easy substitutability  of labor over time. That is, for work- 
ers and  firms to agree  to a contract that requires large changes  in their 
labor input  in  response  to  small  changes  in  productive  opportunities, 
leisure  must  be easily  substitutable  over time.  Otherwise,  one needs  to 
explain why  the worker and the firm do not eliminate inefficient fluctua- 
tions in hours that are not justified by fluctuations  in productivity. 
We have pointed  out earlier that TS models  with reasonably persistent 
technology  shocks  require  a greater labor supply  elasticity  than  do  IR 
models  to  generate  the  same  fluctuations.  This  is  because  in  an  IR 
model,  periods  of high productivity  are by definition  temporary, since it 
Scheinkman  and Weiss (1986) assume  immobile  labor and imperfect credit to generate a 
role for money  as a store of value.  They  do not consider  the role of immobile  labor in 
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is not an equilibrium to produce high output all the time. In contrast, in a 
TS model  driven  by reasonably  permanent  shocks,  good  opportunities 
to work are equally  permanent,  and  so the instantaneous  labor supply 
response  to a shock is small.  Because productivity  changes  are less per- 
manent  in an IR model,  the  labor supply  elasticity  required by such  a 
model  is smaller. 
At the same time, whereas  a TS model depends  on elastic labor supply 
only quantitatively,  an IR model  fails to generate  fluctuations  altogether 
if labor supply  is sufficiently  inelastic.  In a TS model,  less  elastic labor 
supply  dampens  the effects of technological  shocks on output,  and con- 
sequently  reduces  output  volatility.  In  our  model,  in  contrast,  suffi- 
ciently inelastic labor supply  can eliminate  the possibility  of fluctuations 
altogether.  The reason is that when  labor supply  is sufficiently inelastic, 
increases  in industry  output  raise costs  even  if labor productivity  rises, 
and so make the supply  curve slope  up rather than down.  If the supply 
curve slopes  up, the unique  stable equilibrium is constant output.  In this 
way, inelastic labor supply  completely  eliminates  the possibility  that our 
model  can explain business  cycle fluctuations. 
As  this  subsection  suggests,  even  though  TS and  IR models  rely in 
different ways on the elastic labor supply assumption,  they both rely on it 
strongly. More generally, any model that fits the observed fluctuations  of 
labor input  must  rely on this assumption.  For example,  it is needed  for 
countercyclical markup models,  since the decline in markups must more 
than compensate  for the rise in costs in a boom. Keynesian rigid wage mod- 
els also rely on elastic labor supply  to the extent that the cost of setting 
wages  flexibly must  be large to explain the costly  fluctuations  in hours. 
Below  we  offer a few  comments  on  plausibility  of elastic labor supply. 
4.2 THE  PLAUSIBILITY  OF ELASTIC  LABOR  SUPPLY 
Although  the macroeconomic  models  described above require an elastic- 
ity of labor supply  of at least  1 or 2, the elasticity estimated  from micro 
data is extremely  low,  perhaps  around  .3. The reason  for this low  esti- 
mate  is  that  wages  and  hours  for a given  individual  are both  highly 
variable, and are basically uncorrelated.  Put differently, the coefficient of 
the  regression  of the  change  in hours  on  the  change  in wages,  just as 
that of the regression  of the change  in wages  on the change in hours,  is 
close to zero.  The fact that there are many reasons why  measured  hours 
and wages  change,  unrelated  to the labor supply  elasticity, is undoubt- 
edly responsible  for the low estimate  of this elasticity in micro data. This 
observation  has led a number  of researchers  to try to reconcile the low 
labor supply  elasticity  obtained  from micro studies  with a high elasticity 
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One recent approach, begun by Rogerson (1988), starts with the obser- 
vation  that there may be important  non-convexities  in the labor supply 
decision,  such as transportation  costs.  This model  then says that people 
take leisure  in  the  recession  because  it is not  efficient  for everyone  to 
incur these  fixed costs  of going  to work when  productivity  is low. 
We have  two  reservations  about  this approach.  First, it relies on  the 
assumption  that all individuals  are identical.  If there is heterogeneity  of 
individuals'  costs of going  to work,  then changes  in the wage  would  get 
a few  marginal people  to discretely  change  their labor supply  decision, 
but would  not affect hours  for inframarginal workers.  It is by no means 
clear that the resulting  aggregate  labor supply  curve is more elastic than 
it is when  fixed  costs  are absent.  For a similar reason,  the fact that the 
decision  to  eat  Chinese  food  on  a particular day  is  discrete  does  not 
mean that the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  for Chinese  food is 
infinite.  Second,  fixed costs  of going  to work should  equally affect both 
the micro and macro estimates  of labor supply  elasticity. It is not correct 
to say that micro evidence  yields true preference parameters, since micro 
estimates  are also  affected  by  fixed  costs.  This  approach  cannot  then 
explain the inconsistency  between  micro and macro evidence.  Although 
non-convexities  might be part of the explanation  of elastic labor supply, 
they do not reconcile  micro and macro evidence. 
There  seem  to  be  some  more  plausible  ways  to  explain  why  hours 
change  a lot over  the  business  cycle  when  wages  change  only  a little. 
One  obvious  possibility  in the later period is unemployment  insurance 
with  high  replacement  rates  and  imperfect  experience  rating,  which 
should  significantly  raise  the  effective  elasticity  of  labor  supply.  The 
second  possibility  is that people  with  a high  intertemporal  elasticity of 
substitution  should  sort themselves  into  cyclically sensitive  industries. 
That is,  people  who  like to work  hard some  of the time and rest other 
times  have  a strong  comparative  advantage  at working  in durable sec- 
tors,  where  employment  volatility  is  expected.  Third,  the  reason  that 
hours respond  strongly to small changes  in wages  may be that wages  are 
simply  installment  payments  in  a  long-term  relationship  and  do  not 
serve to allocate labor over the short-run.  Finally, it may be the case that 
the  employer  gets  to  choose  employment  at some  fixed  wage  and  so 
effectively  faces an elastic labor supply  even  though  leisure is not easily 
substitutable  over  time.  On  the  surface,  such  a rigid Keynesian  wage 
model  looks  very similar to a model  with a perfectly elastic labor supply 
(Hall 1988b) except with  distinctly  different welfare implications. 
To summarize,  market  clearing  models  of  economic  fluctuations  re- 
quire an intertemporal  labor supply  elasticity of at least 1 or 2, but micro 
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on the intertemporal  elasticity of labor supply  because  it is hard to iden- 
tify temporary  wage  changes  at the individual  level.  Trying to reconcile 
micro  and  macro  evidence  may  not,  therefore,  be  necessary.  A  more 
fruitful approach  might be to understand  why  the true elasticity is high 
or, alternatively, why  wages  are rigid. 
5. The  Behavior  of Relative  Prices 
5.1. OVERVIEW 
In this section,  we  present  evidence  on the behavior of relative prices of 
different  commodity  groups  over the business  cycle.  We then  interpret 
this evidence  in light of IR, TS as well as countercyclical markup models 
of economic  fluctuations. 
IR and TS models  make very strong predictions  about the behavior of 
relative prices. Both models  say that goods produced with low productiv- 
ity  are  expensive  relative  to  goods  produced  with  high  productivity. 
Since low productivity  is associated  with recessions,  the models  say that 
in the recession  the  relative  price of goods  experiencing  a productivity 
decline  should  rise.  This  implication  leads  to a natural question:  what 
are the goods  that become  relatively more expensive  in the recession? By 
isolating  these  goods,  we  can find  the  nexus  of technology  shocks  or 
increasing  returns. 
We consider  several  commodity  groups  and  ask three  questions:  (1) 
What is the cyclical behavior  of the prices of finished  goods,  intermedi- 
ate  goods,  and  raw  materials  relative  to  the  GNP  deflator  and  to  the 
private sector wage?  (2) What is the difference in the cyclical behavior of 
the prices of durable and non-durable  goods  relative to the GNP deflator 
and to the private sector wage? (3) How  do the relative prices of outputs 
and inputs  move  over the cycle? Answers  to these questions  can give us 
some  information  about  the  nexus  of  increasing  returns,  technology 
shocks,  and countercyclical  markups. 
5.2 THE  EVIDENCE 
This  section  presents  the  evidence  on  the  cyclical behavior  of relative 
prices. All the data for this study are annual for 1947-87,  taken from the 
1988 Economic  Report  of  the  President.  Our  cyclical indicator  is  con- 
structed  from the  civilian  unemployment  rate. To make the  regression 
coefficients  interpretable,  we  rescale  this variable before using  it in the 
regression.  First, we  pass  a spline  in time  through  the  unemployment 
rate starting in 1965 to control for changes  in the natural rate of unem- 
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resulting  series  and  take  the  negative of  such  obtained  changes.  This 
gives us a procyclical  measure,  equal to detrended  changes in the employ- 
ment  rate.  In each  business  cycle,  we  define  a boom as the year of the 
fastest  growth  rate of  (detrended)  employment,  and  a recession as  the 
year of the smallest  growth  rate of (detrended)  employment.  Finally, we 
scale these  detrended  growth  rates of employment  so that the average 
over all cycles  of the difference  of growth  rates of employment  between 
boom  and  recession  is  equal  to  .01.  That is,  in  an  average  cycle,  our 
detrended  and  normalized  employment  grows  1% faster  in  the  year 
defined  as a boom  than in the year defined  as a recession.  This cyclical 
indicator is presented  in Figure 4, where vertical lines denote  recessions. 
Importantly, the peaks and troughs  of this indicator coincide with peaks 
and troughs  in the growth  rate of output. 
In addition to using the Normalized Detrended Growth Rate of Employ- 
ment in the analysis,  we  also use a dummy  equal to 1 in 1974 and 1975, 
and 0 in all the other years.  We do so because  the 1974-75  recession  has 
been accompanied  by a large and very unusual  change in relative prices. 
In particular, the relative price of oil and derivative products has increased 
significantly.  The  1980 recession  also  exhibits  this  pattern  of  relative 
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prices, but it is not as pronounced.  Because the 1974-75  recession  looks 
so different from all the others but one,  we did not want to contaminate 
our inference  by this episode.  All the regressions  we  run take the form 
Change in relative price = A + B x  (Cyclical Indicator) + C x (1974-1975 
dummy). 
Tables 3-5  present  the results.  Table 3 presents  the evidence  on prices 
relative to the GNP deflator. Table 4 presents  the results on prices rela- 
tive to the  average  private  sector hourly  earnings.  Table 5 presents  the 
evidence  on  relative  prices.  In  all  tables,  panel  A  deals  with  broad 
groups  of goods  by stage of processing,  and panel B deals with individ- 
ual commodities.  Based  on  the  scaling  of the  cyclical indicator,  all the 
coefficients  in the  tables  are easy  to interpret.  For example,  the  coeffi- 
cient in the finished  goods  regression  in panel A of Table 3 is .79. This 
means  that,  relative  to  the  GNP  deflator,  prices  of  finished  goods  on 
average change  .79% more in a boom  (the year of the fastest increase in 
the employment  rate for each cycle) than in the recession  (the year of the 
lowest  change  in the employment  rate for each cycle). The coefficient of 
4.54 on  the  1974-75  dummy  in this  regression  means  that the price of 
finished  goods  rose  4.54% per  year  faster relative  to  GNP  deflator  in 
1974-75  than in other periods. 
In interpreting  the results of Tables 3-5,  we refer to relative prices that 
yield  a positive  coefficient  on  the  cyclical indicator  as procyclical,  and 
relative  prices  that  yield  a negative  coefficient  as  countercyclical.  The 
regression  coefficient  measures  the difference in the growth rate of rela- 
tive prices between  the boom  (defined  as the year of fastest growth  rate 
of detrended  employment  in each  cycle) and  the recession  (defined  as 
the  year  of  the  lowest  growth  rate of  detrended  employment  in  each 
cycle).  The reason  we  need  such  a relative measure  is that some  prices 
follow  strong  trends,  and  so may, for example,  fall relative to the GNP 
deflator in both booms  and recessions.  If the relative price does not have 
a  trend,  a  positive  regression  coefficient  would  say  that,  the  relative 
price rises in a boom  and falls in a recession.  If, in contrast, the relative 
price is always  falling,  a positive  coefficient would  say that it falls less in 
the  boom  than  it does  in  a recession.  Either way,  the  relative  price is 
procyclical in the  sense  that relative to how they do in a recession, relative 
prices rise in a boom. The  same  logic  explains  why  negative  regression 
coefficients  correspond  to countercyclical  relative prices. 
Two kinds of results emerge  from Table 3. First, finished  goods  do not 
show  much  cyclical  behavior  relative  to  the  GNP  deflator,  except  for 
slightly  countercyclical  relative  price  changes  of  finished  durables.  In Building  Blocks  of Market  Clearing  Business  Cycle  Models  *  277 
Table  3  CYCLICAL  BEHAVIOR  OF PRICES  RELATIVE  TO GNP DEFLATOR 
Cyclical  1974-75 
Variable  Indicator  Dummy 
Panel A: Broad  Groups  by Stage  of Processing 
Finished  goods 
Consumer  durables 
Consumer  non-durables 
Capital  equipment 
Total  intermediate 
Manufacturing  materials 
Construction  materials 
Fuels 
Crude  Materials 
.79  4.54 
(.92)  (3.20) 
-.77  .78 
(-1.00)  (.61) 
.37  7.38 
(.23)  (2.76) 
-.81  4.37 
(-1.00)  (3.26) 
2.69  8.87 
(2.09)  (4.16) 
3.32  10.47 
(2.54)  (4.83) 
3.05  5.69 
(3.41)  (3.84) 
1.31  21.4 
(.36)  (3.52) 
9.91  4.59 
(2.44)  (.68) 










.59  22.04 
(.15)  (3.34) 
1.78  18.94 
(1.18)  (7.58) 
10.58  -3.69 
(4.11)  (-.87) 
3.53  10.07 
(2.62)  (4.52) 
3.65  9.70 
(2.39)  (3.83) 
-.67  4.81 
(-.70)  (3.05) 
-.20  2.08 
(-.29)  (1.79) 
-2.08  .11 
(-2.03)  (.07) 
4.05  8.89 
(1.67)  (2.22) 
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Table  4  CYCLICAL  BEHAVIOR  OF PRICES  RELATIVE  TO AVERAGE 
HOURLY  EARNINGS  OF PRIVATE-SECTOR  EMPLOYEES 
Cyclical  1974-75 
Indicator  Dummy  Variable 
Panel A: Broad  Groups  by Stage  of Processing 
Finished  goods 
Consumer  durables 
Consumer  nondurables 
Capital  equipment 
Total  intermediate 
Manufacturing  materials 
Construction  materials 
Fuels 
Crude  Materials 
.29  6.35 
(.30)  (3.98) 
-1.27  2.59 
(-1.72)  (2.12) 
-.13  9.19 
(-.08)  (3.29) 
-1.31  6.18 
(-1.65)  (4.69) 
2.19  10.68 
(1.63)  (4.80) 
2.82  12.28 
(2.08)  (5.47) 
2.55  7.50 
(2.99)  (5.30) 
.82  23.2 
(.22)  (3.76) 
9.41  6.40 
(2.29)  (.94) 










.09  23.85 
(.02)  (3.59) 
1.28  20.75 
(.79)  (7.73) 
10.08  -1.88 
(4.01)  (-.45) 
3.03  11.88 
(2.13)  (5.05) 
3.15  11.52 
(2.07)  (4.57) 
-1.17  6.62 
(-1.24)  (4.23) 
-.70  3.90 
(-1.06)  (3.54) 
-2.58  1.92 
(-2.55)  (1.15) 
3.55  10.71 
(1.42)  (2.59) 
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contrast,  prices  of  intermediate  goods  other  than  fuels  are  highly 
procyclical.  For example,  in  an  average  cycle  manufacturing  materials 
grow  3.32%  faster  relative  to  the  GNP  deflator  in  a boom  than  in  a 
recession.  One  exception  to  this  is  capital  equipment,  which  may  be 
thought  of  as  an  intermediate  good,  and  which  shows  mildly  coun- 
tercyclical  prices.  By  far the  most  procyclical  are  the  prices  of  crude 
materials.  In an  average  cycle,  crude  materials  prices  rise 9.91% more 
relative to the GNP deflator in a boom  than they do in a recession.  The 
procyclicality of prices clearly declines  as one gets further in the produc- 
tion chain. 
Similar results come from the more narrowly defined commodities.  As 
is well known,  prices of lumber, metals,  paper, and rubber are extremely 
procyclical.  In  contrast,  prices  of  finished  durable  goods,  including 
household  durables,  machinery,  and vehicles  are countercyclical.  Com- 
modities  such as power  and,  surprisingly,  chemicals do not show  much 
action over the cycle. 
Table 4 confirms  the  results  of Table 3, except  that the  evidence  is a 
little  stronger.  Relative  to  the  private  sector  average  hourly  earnings, 
prices of finished  goods  do  not  show  any cyclical behavior  except  that 
durables and capital equipment  are more clearly countercyclical. Relative 
prices of raw materials and intermediate  goods  are, in contrast, strongly 
procyclical, except for capital equipment.  Durable goods,  such as house- 
hold  durables  and  vehicles,  show  the opposite  pattern.  Tables 3 and 4 
show  very  clearly that the place to look for productivity  declines  in the 
recession  is finished  durable goods.  Table 4 also suggests  that procyclical 
real wages  are most  pronounced  in terms  of durables-a  finding  com- 
mon to real wage  studies. 
Table 5 presents  some  more  novel  results,  namely  those  on  relative 
prices.  The  conclusion  of  Table 5 is  that,  in the  production  chain,  the 
relative price of outputs  to inputs  is countercyclical.  For example,  rela- 
tive  to  intermediate  materials,  finished  goods  grow  1.9% less  in  the 
boom  than in the recession.  Relative to crude materials,  this number is 
9.1%. Throughout  this  table,  the  result is that prices of finished  goods 
are countercyclical  relative  to intermediate  goods  and  crude materials, 
and  prices  of  intermediate  goods  are countercyclical  relative  to  crude 
materials. 
Similar results  emerge  from panel  B of Table 5.  Relative to the  price 
of  lumber,  those  of  construction  materials  and  household  durables 
move  countercyclically.  Relative  to  the  price of manufacturing  materi- 
als,  those  of  vehicles,  household  durables,  and  machinery  also  move 
countercyclically.  Relative  to the price of metals,  those  of vehicles,  ma- 
chinery,  household  durables  are again  countercyclical.  It is  very  clear 280 *  MURPHY,  SHLEIFER  & VISHNY 
from  this  table  that  the  price  of  outputs  relative  to  that  of  inputs  is 
countercyclical. 
We draw  three conclusions  from Tables 3-5.  First, the more finished 
are the goods,  the less  procyclical are their relative prices.  Second,  the 
goods  that exhibit  the most  countercyclical  relative prices are durables. 
Third,  outputs  appreciate  relative  to  inputs  in  the  recession.  Impor- 
tantly, these  results are very similar to those found for the Great Depres- 
sion period by Mills (1936) and Means et al. (1939) for a broader range of 
commodities.  However,  in  the  Great Depression,  real wages  actually 
increased,  and  so these  findings  can be rationalized by the observation 
that the  relative  price  of goods  with  a greater labor content  should  be 
higher. Our starting point,  in contrast, is that in the postwar period real 
wages  have been if anything  procyclical. Our next task is to interpret our 
findings  for the postwar  period. 
Table  5  CYCLICAL  BEHAVIOR  OF RELATIVE  PRICES 
Cyclical  1974-75 
Variable  Indicator  Dummy 
Panel A: Broad  Groups  by Stage  of Processing 
Finished goods/Total  intermediate  -1.90  -4.33 
(-2.96)  (-4.07) 
Finished  goods/Fuels  -.53  -16.85 
(-.17)  (-3.25) 
Finished  goods/Crude materials  -9.12  -.052 
(-2.61)  (-.009) 
Consumer  durables/Total  intermediate  -3.46  -8.09 
(-2.77)  (-3.91) 
Consumer  durables/Manufacturing  materials  -4.09  -9.69 
(-3.32)  (-4.74) 
Consumer  non-durables/Total  intermediate  -2.32  -1.49 
(-2.57)  (-.995) 
Consumer  non-durables/Manufacturing  materials  -2.96  -3.09 
(-2.57)  (-1.62) 
Capital  equipment/Total  intermediate  -3.50  -4.50 
(-2.72)  (-2.11) 
Capital  equipment/Manufacturing  materials  -4.13  -6.10 
(-3.24)  (-2.89) 
Total  intermediate/Crude  materials  -7.22  4.28 
(-2.37)  (.850) 
Manufacturing  materials/Crude  materials  -6.59  5.88 
(-2.08)  (1.12) 
Construction  materials/Crude  materials  -6.86  1.10 
(-1.87)  (.181) Building  Blocks  of  Market  Clearing  Business  Cycle  Models  *  281 
5.3 INTERPRETATION 
The  evidence  in  Tables 3-5  allows  us  to discriminate  at least  partially 
between  various  business  cycle stories.  One  story-which  we  associate 
with  Long  and  Plosser  (1983)-is  that  technology  shocks  occur in  the 
production  of  widely  used  raw  materials  or intermediate  inputs,  and 
then spread across the economy  through the input-output  matrix. These 
shocks  need  not  even  be  technology  shocks;  they  can simply  be  price 
shocks  to  inputs  supplied  from  outside  the  economy,  like  oil.  An  IR 
version  of this theory  says  that increasing  returns are in the production 
of raw materials or intermediate  goods.  As a result,  these  are the activi- 
ties experiencing  major productivity  declines  in the recession.  Both TS 
and IR versions  of this story predict that the relative price of raw materi- 
als and/or intermediate  goods  is countercyclical. 
Table  5  CYCLICAL  BEHAVIOR  OF RELATIVE  PRICES  (CONTINUED) 
Cyclical  1974-75 
Variable  Indicator  Dummy 
Panel B: Broad  Groups  and  Commodities 
Total  intermediate/Metals  -.96  -.83 
(-.92)  (-.48) 
Manufacturing  materials/Metals  -.33  .77 
(-.37)  (.52) 
Construction  materials/Metals  -.60  -4.01 
(-.58)  (-2.33) 
Construction  materials/Lumber  -7.53  9.38 
(-3.46)  (2.61) 
Vehicles/Manufacturing  materials  -5.40  -10.36 
(-3.14)  (-3.63) 
Household durables/Manufacturing  materials  -3.52  -8.39 
(-3.26)  (-4.68) 
Machinery/Manufacturing  materials  -3.99  -5.66 
(-3.31)  (-2.83) 
Vehicles/Metals  -5.73  -9.59 
(-3.37)  (-3.41) 
Machinery/Metals  -4.32  -4.89 
(-3.17)  (-2.17) 
Household durables/Metals  -3.85  -7.62 
(-2.92)  (-3.49) 
Capital  equipment/Metals  -4.46  -5.33 
(-3.27)  (-2.36) 
Household durables/Lumber  -10.78  5.77 
(-4.01)  (1.30) 
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This story is inconsistent  with  the evidence  in Tables 3-5.  The tables 
confirm the standard finding  that the relative prices of raw materials are 
extremely  procyclical.  An exception  might  be the case of oil in 1974-75 
and  1979-80.  However,  except  in these  episodes,  it is clear that reces- 
sions  are not driven by adverse  shocks  or endogenous  productivity  de- 
clines  in raw materials  or in intermediate  goods.  This fact also poses  a 
problem  for  the  Long/Plosser  theory  of  co-movement,  which  works 
through  shocks  to common  inputs. 
The evidence  in Tables 3-5  is much  more favorable to the view  that 
productivity  changes  occur at the latter stages of the production process, 
particularly in durable  goods.  The IR version  of the  story says  that in- 
creasing returns occur in the final stages of production  or distribution of 
durables  or possibly  at the  stage  of producing  capital equipment.  The 
productivity  of these  stages  declines  in the recessions,  and therefore the 
relative price of durables rises. The reason that relative price movements 
are so pronounced  for wide  categories  of goods  is that the co-movement 
mechanism  outlined  in the previous  section  leads  to synchronization  of 
output  and productivity  movements  across sectors. 
The TS version of this story is somewhat  different, and harder to recon- 
cile with the evidence.  In the TS world, the goods that get expensive  in the 
recession  are only  the  goods  experiencing  adverse  technology  shocks, 
and  not  the  goods  whose  output  declines  simply  because  of  co- 
movement.  This is an important  difference  between  IR and TS models: 
even though both generate co-movement  with immobile labor and imper- 
fect borrowing,  the TS model  exhibits  countercyclical  price movements 
only  in  the  sectors  with  bad  shocks.  In contrast,  the  IR model  yields 
relative  price  increases  in  all increasing  returns  sectors  in response  to 
output declines.  To reconcile the TS model with the evidence,  to bring on a 
recession  one  needs  fairly widespread  adverse  technology  shocks  in ei- 
ther the finished  durable goods  sectors or in the capital equipment  sector. 
We leave  to the reader to evaluate  the plausibility  of pervasive  adverse 
technology  shocks  in durable goods  sectors as a cause of recessions. 
Before concluding  this section,  we stress that the evidence  in Tables 3- 
5 is  also  broadly  consistent  with  countercyclical  markups  at the  later 
production  stages,  especially  in durables.  None  of the evidence  we have 
presented  bears on the behavior of true productivity; all the action might 
well be in markups.  Hall's (1988a) earlier evidence  can be interpreted in 
terms of countercyclical  markups,  although  his later (1988c) work points 
to true increasing  returns. As we mentioned  before, however,  Hall finds 
evidence  of declining  average costs and firms earning close to zero prof- 
its. This finding  points  to countercyclical  markups as a way  to generate 
procyclical real wages.  Domowitz,  Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) present Building  Blocks  of  Market  Clearing  Business  Cycle  Models  *  283 
some  evidence  bearing  on  this  issue,  and  conclude  that markups  are 
countercyclical.  At this point,  we  are not sure which  theory is right and 
leave this issue  to a further investigation. 
In summary,  the  evidence  presented  in this  section  enables  us  to at 
least  partially  narrow  down  the  range  of  theories  consistent  with  the 
data.  If economic  fluctuations  are driven  by  technology  shocks,  these 
must  be  pervasive  shocks  across  durable  good  industries,  and  not  in 
intermediate  input  industries.  If fluctuations  are driven  by  increasing 
returns,  these  must  be  in  the  production  and  distribution  of  durable 
goods.  Finally, fluctuations  could be explained  by countercyclical mark- 
ups in durable good  industries,  without  productivity  movements. 
6. Conclusion 
In this  paper  we  have  discussed  models  of business  cycles  driven  by 
movements  of productivity.  In particular, we  have compared  models  in 
which  these  productivity  movements  result from exogenous  technology 
shocks  with  models  in which  they  result from endogenous  movements 
along  an increasing  returns production  function.  We asked  what  kinds 
of assumptions  these  models  require to at least roughly  fit the data. We 
have  found  that although  these  models  have  very  different  sources  of 
productivity  changes,  the assumptions  required to fit the data are very 
similar.  First,  to  generate  large  movements  in  output  in  response  to 
small changes  in productivity,  these  models  rely on durability of goods. 
Second,  to  produce  co-movement  of  outputs  and  labor inputs  across 
various sectors of the economy,  these models  need to assume  specialized 
(immobile)  labor and restricted borrowing.  Third, to obtain large move- 
ments  in  labor  inputs  in  response  to  small  changes  in  real wages  or 
productivity,  these  models  require very  elastic labor supply.  Although 
none  of these  results  is completely  new,  we  hope  that our emphasis  on 
identifying  the critical building  blocks of a market clearing model proves 
useful. 
Our paper has also documented  the countercyclical behavior of prices 
of outputs  relative  to inputs,  and of finished  durables relative to wages 
and to the GNP deflator. This evidence  suggests  that the place to look for 
technology  shocks  or increasing  returns is at the final stages  of produc- 
tion,  or in the  distribution  of durable  goods.  In the increasing  returns 
framework,  this  evidence  supports  illiquid  markets  models  of  reces- 
sions.  In these  models,  time  to sale is long  and therefore  the marginal 
cost is high in the recession.  The fact that such variable liquidity costs are 
most plausible  for durable goods  is evidence  favorable to this approach. 
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discussed,  but that we  have  not dealt with  for lack of space.  The first is 
downward  rigid real wages  as an alternative to elastic labor supply. Even 
if one  assumes  downward  rigid real wages,  one  still needs  a source  of 
productivity changes-such  as increasing returns or technology  shocks- 
to generate  shifts  in labor demand.  Downward  rigid real wages  would 
probably exacerbate  the  recession  in a model  of the sort we  described, 
because firms might shut down  even when  they would not with a flexible 
real wage.  Downward  rigid real wages  also make the co-movement  story 
look more like an aggregate  demand  story: instead of changes  in relative 
prices we get changes  in income  and in demand  for individual  goods.  It 
remains to be explored  what  are some  of the other consequences  of this 
assumption. 
We have also ignored  what is perhaps  the most natural explanation  of 
our evidence  on cyclical behavior of relative prices: countercyclical mark- 
ups  without  productivity  changes.  There are a number  of reasons  why 
producers  of durables in a recession  might not want to cut prices even if 
marginal costs  fall when  input  prices decline.  Most plausibly, we  think 
that  the  customer  mix  shifts  in  the  recession  away  from buyers  with 
elastic demand,  and so the profit maximizing  markup rises. This change 
of customer  base might  occur because  most people  would  require enor- 
mous  price concessions  to buy durables in a recession.  The only remain- 
ing  customers  are those  who  need  to replace  durables  that have  fallen 
apart and  so  have  inelastic  demand.  The change  in the  customer  base 
might  also occur if people  who  shop  around  and therefore have  elastic 
demand  are precisely  the ones  who  have very low  reservation prices in 
the recession-they  may be individuals  who  face the risk of unemploy- 
ment or firms fearing bankruptcy. Such theories of countercyclical mark- 
ups,  developed  in  particular  by  Phelps/Winter  (1970),  Okun  (1981), 
Stiglitz (1984), Bils (1986), Weitzman (1982), and Solow (1984), can proba- 
bly  explain  most  of  our  evidence.  Not  surprisingly,  one  can build  an 
endogenous  business  cycle  model  driven  by  countercyclical  markups 
without  productivity  changes. 
Finally, all of our discussion  has assumed  a fixed capital stock in pro- 
duction.  In contrast, technology  shocks models  incorporate capital in the 
production  function.  Capital in these models  serves in part as a propaga- 
tion  device,  whereby  today's  technology  improvements  lead  to an in- 
crease  in  the  capital  stock  and  therefore  labor productivity  tomorrow. 
There are also  increasing  returns  models  in  which  a business  cycle  is 
generated  by  movements  in  the  capital  stock  (Shleifer  1986; Kiyotaki 
1988). In these  models,  waves  of investment  raise productivity  and in- 
come,  and  so lead  to increased  demand  for goods.  The higher demand Building Blocks  of Market  Clearing  Business Cycle Models *  285 
for  goods  in  turn  justifies  the  initial  investment  outlay.  Unifying  the 
increasing  returns  models  discussed  in  this  paper  with  increasing  re- 
turns  investment  models  remains  a stopic  for future  work. 
We are grateful  to Olivier Blanchard,  Peter Diamond, and Larry  Katz for helpful com- 
ments and to the NSF for financial  support. 
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Comment 
EDWARD  C. PRESCOTT 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis  and the University  of Minnesota 
Over  the  last  two  decades  much  progress  has  been  made  in  macro- 
economics.  Using  established  theory-that  is the theory used by leading 
people  in  public  finance-we  have  found  that variations  in the  Solow 
technology  parameter are an important source of aggregate fluctuations 
in the postwar  period.  Business  cycles  are not an anomaly  for standard 
neoclassical theory. The methodology  employed  is quantitative neoclassi- 
cal theory. The model  economies  are calibrated to national income  and 
product  accounts  and  household  surveys.  Equilibrium policy  rules  for 
the  economic  agents  are  computed  and  then  used  to  determine  the 
sampling  distribution  of various  statistics. 
Subsequent  to Kydland  and  my  "Time to Build" paper, a number  of 
issues  have been  explored  with  this methodology.  For example,  Cooley 
and Hansen  (1988) have  explored  the implications  of a cash-in-advance 
constraint for aggregate  fluctuations.  They found that they were not very 
important.  Danthine  and Donaldson  (1989) have come to similar conclu- 
sions  with  regard  to  the  introduction  of  an efficiency  wage  construct. 
Huffman,  Greenwald,  and Hercowitz  (1988) have studied the behavior of 
economies  in which the capital depreciation rate increases with the inten- 
sity with which  capital is utilized.  Again,  the consequences  for aggregate 
fluctuations were minor. Hansen  and Sargent (1988) found that introduc- 
ing both a straight time and overtime work options  significantly enriches 
the theory but does not alter the finding that the Solow technology  shocks 
are an important  source of fluctuations. 
What  Does Matter? 
Hansen  (1985) introduced  the Rogerson  (1988) labor indivisibilities  and 
found  it did matter and did matter a lot for business  cycle accounting.  It 
also  mattered  for  assessing  the  importance  of  public  finance  shocks 
which  recently  have  been  explored  by  Christiano  and  Eichenbaum 
(1988),  Chang  (1988),  Braun  (1988),  and  McGratten  (1988) using  this 
methodology.  If both  the  hours  a plant is operated  and  the number  of 
workers  that operate  a plant are choice  variables,  the results  are essen- 
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tially the same as for the Hansen economy with the labor indivisibility. 
Most the variation  in aggregate hours is accounted for by changes in the 
number employed. Changes in the hours worked per employed person 
accounts  for the  rest of the variation in the aggregate  labor input.  Hall 
(1988) surveys  the evidence  on the intertemporal  substitution  of leisure 
and  comes  to the  conclusion  that in the aggregate  leisure  is highly  in- 
tertemporally  substitutable.  Given  this  property, any relatively  perma- 
nent  change  in a factor that affects the steady  state of the deterministic 
growth  model  will contribute  to aggregate  fluctuations.  The question  is 
how  much each contributes. 
What  are  the  Justifications  for Static  Marshallian  Increasing 
Returns? 
The key feature  of the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny  paper is their introduc- 
tion  of  a production  externality.  The  authors  assume  it and  refer to a 
more  rigorous  paper  in  which  the  underlying  micro  foundations  of 
such  a structure  are developed.  I examined  the cited paper and found 
the  argument  heuristic  and  incomplete,  and  not  yet  up  to  the  stan- 
dards  of  modern  general  equilibrium  theory.  What are the  theoretical 
justifications  for  these  static  increasing  returns  at  the  industry  level 
but  not  at the  firm level?  One  justification  for Marshallian  increasing 
industry  returns  is  Arrow's  learning-by-doing.  But,  this  is  a dynamic 
relation.  It is  not  temporary  increases  in  the  average  product  of labor 
at the firm level  that are associated  with  temporary increases  in indus- 
try output  as in  the  Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny  model.  Another  justifica- 
tion  for  industry  increasing  returns  is  induced  technological  change. 
Jacob Schmookler  (1966) has  presented  evidence  for demand  induced 
technological  change.  But  that  also  is  a  dynamic  story.  Changes  are 
permanent.  What is  the  empirical  evidence  for static industry  increas- 
ing returns  to scale? How  big are they? Where are the measurements? 
Do  Chrysler's  costs  decline  when  Ford  is  producing  more  automo- 
biles?  Maybe,  but  I want  to  see  some  evidence  before  taking  the  as- 
sumption  seriously. 
One question  that has not yet been addressed  within  the quantitative 
theoretical  framework  is  whether  the  findings  are sensitive  to  the  as- 
sumption  of  price-taking  behavior.  Does  abstracting from the fact that 
the  corner  drugstore  has  some  monopoly  power  significantly  bias the 
estimate of the importance  of Solow  technology  shocks-or  for that mat- 
ter the importance  of public finance shocks,  terms of trade shocks,  etc.? 
This is an interesting  question.  I do not know  how  to answer it, and it is 
not an easy question  to answer.  The theory of monopolistic  competition Comment  289 
in  dynamic stochastic environments is  not  well  developed.  In  the 
growth literature  there are a couple of deterministic  models, but typi- 
cally they  are steady-state or balanced growth models.  I, however, 
would be surprised if a little ex post monopoly power necessitated a 
significant  revision in the estimate of the importance  of Solow technol- 
ogy shocks as a source of aggregate fluctuations. 
One empirical embarrassment for increasing returns stories is that 
hours of employment and productivity  should move together. They do 
not. At the business cycle frequencies, the correlation  is about -0.2  (see 
Christiano  and Eichenbaum  1988). There surely are errors  in measuring 
the labor  input and as a result the correlation  is larger  than -0.2,  but it is 
a lot less than one. If technology shocks were the only source of fluctua- 
tions, standard theory implies that this correlation  would be near 1.0. 
But we do not claim that these shocks are the only source. All that Finn 
Kydland and I argue is that they are a major source and that the econ- 
omy would be almost as volatile if they were the only source. Inciden- 
tally,  when defense expenditure  went from 5 to 13 percent  of GNP at the 
beginning of the Korean  War,  productivity  did not jump. It fell. 
The authors claim that an implication of standard  theory is that em- 
ployment in the consumption-good  producing  and investment-good  pro- 
ducing sectors should move in opposite directions  if technology shocks 
are the only source of fluctuations. For the Hansen economy (1985)  this 
is not the case. Employment in the consumption-good industry stays 
constant given that in the aggregate  leisure is infinitely substitutable  (as 
it is in the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny  economy). If leisure is durable,  as it 
is in Kydland and my models (1982 and 1988), employment can be 
procyclical.  It is for the Kydland  and Prescott  (1988)  model economy.  The 
authors say Kydland and I assume the shocks are persistent. That is 
wrong. I, and Nelson and Plosser earlier (1982), found that they were 
highly persistent. It is an empirical  finding-not  an assumption. 
Why did productivity  fall in coal mining in the Seventies if there were 
increasing industry returns? There was an increase in output in that 
industry during that period. People in that industry did not know why 
productivity  fell. One coal mining company funded a study at Carnegie- 
Mellon (Goodman and Leyden (1985)) to find out the reason for the 
decline-a  decline associated with an increase in output. There are ran- 
dom, that is, currently  unpredictable,  changes in production  functions. 
This is a fact. 
The authors report the finding that output and employment changes 
are correlated  across industries. This was known-see  Burns  and Mitch- 
ell (1947). Is there a close association between quarterly  changes in em- 
ployment and output per workers? I doubt it. Determining industry 290 *  PRESCOTT 
output and inputs  on a quarterly basis is fraught with problems.  Even at 
the annual  level  it is not  easy. Jorgenson,  Gallop,  and Fraumeni (1987) 
find that productivity  changes  are correlated and do not average out.  If 
they  did average  out,  there would  not be any aggregate  shocks  and an 
implication  of standard  theory  would  be that Solow  technology  shocks 
are not an important  source of fluctuations. 
At the low  frequencies  Bailey and Gordon (1988) have concluded  that 
a productivity  slowdown  has indeed  occurred.  They point  out that the 
slowdown  is across most of the industries.  With increasing returns why 
did productivity  growth  slow  even  though  output growth did not slow? 
The reason  that output  growth  did not decline,  even  though  productiv- 
ity growth  did,  is that the  growth  rate of employment  increased.  This 
observation  matches  poorly with the implication of the Murphy-Shleifer- 
Vishny  model  with  its  implication  that  employment  and  productivity 
move  together.  To summarize,  the static increasing returns has not been 
justified.  Economics  has come  a long  way  since the Thirties when  busi- 
ness  cycle  stories  were  a dime  a dozen-see  Godfrey  Haberler's (1937) 
book, Prosperity  and Depression, for a plethora of them.  I hope  we do not 
go back to the Thirties when  theory had no quantitative discipline. 
The final point  of these  comments  is that standard theory  should  be 
used to address  specific questions.  In challenging  Kydland and my find- 
ing, the authors are challenging  the findings  of Jorgenson and Yun (1988) 
concerning  the  1986  tax  reform  and  a  lot  of  other  findings  that  use 
established  theory. I do not think that the authors have made much of a 
case for using production  functions  that display static increasing returns. 
I will stick with  Solow's  (1957) neoclassical  theory for studying  business 
cycle fluctuations  until someone  develops  a better alternative.  What de- 
termines the rate of technology  change is another matter. There I conjec- 
ture increasing  returns are important. 
Prepared  for NBER  Annual Conference  on Macroeconomics.  Organized  by Olivier  Jean 
Blanchard  and Stanley S. Fischer,  held March  10 and 11, 1989  Cambridge,  Massachusetts. 
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characteristics as the basic model  used  by the authors.  I found this alter- 
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discuss  the  issue  of  co-movements  across  different  industries  and  the 
relationship  between  co-movements  and  budget  constraints.  Third,  I 
want  to relate  the  model  to the  large gross  flows  of jobs and  workers 
which  exist in the U.S.  economy. 
1. Basic  Model 
Consider a static model with a continuum  of identical agents.  Each agent 
can work  zero  or one.  Without  work,  there  is no  output.  With work, 
output is either x or y, x<y,  depending  on whether  everyone  else works 
or not.  I will  not  worry  about  circumstances  where  only  some  of  the 
population  works,  since  this  will  not  happen  in  the  equilibria consid- 
ered.  I assume  there are no other possible  contacts between  individuals 
except  through  the  increasing  returns  to  scale  production  externality. 
Utility is separable.  With a suitable normalization,  utility is equal to U(0), 
U(x) -  1, or U(y) -  1, depending  on the possible  circumstances.  We now 
assume  that these  values  satisfy 
U(x) -  1 <  U(O)<  U(y) -  1  (1) 
Then there are two equilibria, with everyone  working and no one work- 
ing.  The  two  inequalities  in  (1)  assure  the  presence  of  each  of  the 
equilibria. 
Now  consider  stringing  together  a continuum  of these  static models. 
We have a dynamic rational expectations  path with any time structure we 
would  like for the choice  between  the two  static equilibrium positions. 
To get  a little more  structure on  the range of possible  outcomes,  the 
next step is to modify  preferences.  (For an argument that the continuous 
time  additive  utility  function  does  not  have  appealing  properties,  see 
Huang  and Kreps 1987.) Following  the authors' description  of durables 
(which  also  can be interpreted  as applying  to non-durables),  we  write 
instantaneous  utility  as a function  of a stock variable,  U(k), and have k 
deteriorate  at  the  exponential  rate d and  grow  at the  rates  0,  x,  or y 
according to the level of output.  We now let lifetime utility be the present 
discounted  value  of U, with utility discount  rate r. Putting this structure 
into preferences  rather than durability of the good avoids the embarrass- 
ment  of having  durability but not storability since inventories  certainly 
complicate  and may alter the equilibrium. 
If the  economy  is always  at the  high  output  level,  the  consumption 
stock variable will converge  to yld. We assume  that preferences  are such 
that this  is not  an equilibrium.  That is,  we  assume  that someone  with Comment  293 
consumption  stock yld and marginal product y would  choose not to work 
(for some  interval  of  time)  even  if  everyone  else  were  continuing  to 
work.  In order to derive  this condition,  we  need  to derive  the shadow 
value  of y units  of  output.  The  shadow  value  is  equal  to  the  present 
discounted  value  of the marginal utility of depreciated  output  given  the 
time path of future production.  Thus,  we  can rule out this steady  state 
by assuming  that the marginal utility of continued  production,  assuming 
indefinitely  continued  production,  is less than the marginal disutility of 
work: 
yU'(yld)lr+d)  <  1  (2) 
Similarly, we can rule out convergence  to the origin by assuming  that it is 
worth producing  at zero stock even  if no one else produces: 
xU'(O)l(r  + d) > 1  (3) 
Thus this economy  does  not have a steady state with everyone  behaving 
the same. 
Considering  only  uniform  behavior,  the  alternative  equilibrium con- 
figuration has output  alternately produced  and not. As set up, there are 
many  such  paths  as  coordinated  behavior  among  producers  switches 
production  on  and  off.  These  include  what  the  authors  call chattering 
paths  with  output  switching  on and off to keep  the consumption  stock 
constant.  To cut down  on the number of such paths,  we could assume  a 
fixed cost to beginning  a production  run. This would  require modifica- 
tion of the  conditions  above  to preserve  the results.  Someone  contem- 
plating the start of production  at the origin would  have to overcome  the 
setup  cost; someone  considering  a temporary  stop to production  at the 
high  output  steady  state would  have  to save  enough  while  stopped  to 
overcome  the fixed cost of starting up again. Similarly, equilibrium cycles 
would  have  to  last  long  enough  to  justify  the  setup  cost.  These  are 
technicalities,  so I will not alter the assumptions. 
Following  the  authors,  let  us  focus  on  the  cycle  with  the  longest 
phases.  To consider  rational  expectations  paths,  we  shall consider  the 
shadow  price  of  a unit  of  output,  which  is  denoted  p.  On  a rational 
expectations  path the value of a unit of consumption  stock is the present 
discounted  value  of the marginal utility of the remaining  (i.e.,  depreci- 
ated) stock. Differentiating  this equation we have the familiar asset value 
differential equation. 
dp/dt = (r + d)p -  U'(k)  (4) 294 *  DIAMOND 
This equation  holds  whether  the good  is being produced  or not. 
In Figures la and b, we consider  the phase diagrams with the shadow 
price of a unit  of output  on the vertical axis and the stock of consumer 
goods  on  the  horizontal  axis.  We have  two  possible  uniform  behavior 
regimes.  If everyone  is producing,  we  have 
dkldt =y  -  dk  (5) 
Alternatively,  if no one is producing,  we have 
dkldt =  -dk  (6) 
In both figures,  I have drawn the stationary locus dpldt = 0. It is drawn to 
satisfy the two  conditions,  (2) and (3), that guarantee  that there is not a 
steady  state equilibrium.  Thus the stationary locus is below  1/y where  it 
crosses  k = y/d and it is above  1/x where  it reaches the axis. Also drawn 
in are the directions  of motion. 
A rational expectations  path satisfies  the differential equations  above, 
satisfying  the  appropriate  equation  for dkldt as production  is or is not 
profitable  given  the  behavior  of  other  producers.  It also  satisfies  the 
initial condition  on the consumption  stock variable, and a transversality 
condition  on the shadow  price. 
In Figure  la,  we  cannot  go below  the line p =  1/y, since  that would 
contradict the profitability of production  that makes Figure la the appro- 
priate  figure.  In  Figure  lb,  we  cannot  go  above  the  line  p  =  1/x.  A 
rational  expectations  path  spends  some  of  its  time  in  Figure  la,  and 
some of its time in Figure lb.  We consider only cycles that have precisely 
two phases,  although  one  could construct more complicated  paths with 
many  different  alternatively  expanding  and  contracting  phases  before 
returning  to  the  initial  position,  if  ever.  Since  the  rate  of  horizontal 
movement  is independent  of p in each diagram, we will find the equilib- 
rium  cycle  with  the  longest  phases  by  looking  for  the  one  with  the 
greatest  width.  This cycle has  the two  phases  drawn in Figures la  and 
lb,  where  trajectories cross the  stationary locus  (and so are horizontal) 
as low  and  as high  as possible.  The entire  cycle is shown  in Figure 2. 
To see  that this is the  cycle with  the longest  phases,  let us first note 
that if production  ceases  to the left of the stationary locus,  movement  in 
Figure lb  is then  to the southwest.  Second,  we  note  that on any trajec- 
tory in Figure la  which  is to the left of the trajectory drawn,  we  cannot 
move  to  the  right  of  the  stationary  locus  since  production  must  stop 
when  the path crosses  the horizontal  line at 1/y. Thus,  any point to the 
left of the trajectory drawn is not part of an equilibrium cycle. Similarly, Comment  295 
Figure la: dpldt =  (r + d)p -  U'(k) 
dkldt = y -  dk 
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we note that movement  in Figure la to the right of the stationary locus is 
to the northeast  and that any path in Figure lb to the right of the drawn 
path cannot move  to the left of the stationary locus.  In Figure 2, we have 
concluded  that some  of the  points  outside  the closed  curve can not be 
part of  a cyclic  equilibrium.  The  remaining  points  outside  the  closed 
curve could be initial points for an equilibrium path, but are not points to 
which  a rational expectations  path could return. Thus the candidates  for 
recurrent equilibria are on and inside  the closed  curve in Figure 2. Since 
the width  of a path relates monotonically  to the time on the path (over 
the same k values),  paths inside  the cycle have shorter phases  than those 
on the closed curve drawn.  Inside the closed curve, every point is part of 
a continuum  of equilibrium paths. All the chattering paths on the station- 
ary locus inside  the cycle are also equilibria. 
What  should  we  learn  from  this  exercise?  It is certainly  possible  to 
construct  equilibrium  cycles  from  increasing  returns  in  production. 
Moreover,  in  such  an  exercise,  the  rational expectations  paths  are not 
unique,  leaving  an unreasonable  scope  for coordinated beliefs. 
We have  modeled  this equilibrium  as a non-market  equilibrium with 
no interactions  except  for the production  externality. It is interesting  to 
ask whether  there is a market economy  with the same equilibria. That is, 
if we  allow  trading in consumer  goods  and labor, do there exist vectors 
Figure  2 
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of consumer  prices,  wages,  and interest rates such that there is no trade 
when  everyone  optimizes  subject to a lifetime  budget  constraint? It ap- 
pears that the answer  is yes,  with  the wage  as numeraire each moment 
of time,  the price equal to the shadow  price, and the interest rate equal 
to the utility discount  rate. We need  to assume  a continuum  of identical 
firms, each capable of hiring one worker, with  more jobs than workers. 
Competition  in the  labor market then  determines  the real wage  as the 
value  of the marginal product  of labor. Zero profits imply that firms are 
willing  to  produce  or  not,  as  desired,  provided  that  they  are coordi- 
nated.  Workers want  to provide  labor when  the  wage  is high  and  not 
otherwise.  Consumers  are content  with  the pattern of consumption  by 
construction  of the shadow  price of a consumer  good.  Thus we have an 
equilibrium  with  lifetime  budget  constraints.  The equilibrium has  pro- 
cyclical real wages. 
2. Co-movements 
Now  let us  consider  two  identical  sectors,  each  as described  above.  If 
there  is no  connection  between  the  sectors,  there  is no  reason  for the 
cycles  to  be  the  same  in  the  two  sectors.  If we  want  to  consider  co- 
movements,  we  need  to link the sectors.  The natural candidate for link- 
age is through  demand.  Let each  consumer  demand  both  goods  (with 
additive  utility  from the  two  stocks),  although  production  continues  to 
be specialized.  For now,  assume  that labor is immobile between  sectors, 
so  that  demand  is  the  only  linkage.  We  continue  to  assume  lifetime 
budget constraints.  The equations  above need to be changed  slightly. Let 
us  consider  equilibria where  consumption  stocks  of the two  goods  are 
the  same  vector  for consumers  working  in  the  two  sectors.  Then,  the 
pricing equation  is unchanged.  However,  one's  stock of one's own  good 
only grows  at the rate y/2 -  dk when  production  is positive.  We assume 
that the figures  are the  same  as drawn above  after this change.  Now,  a 
perfectly coordinated  cycle is an equilibrium with consumer  goods  trad- 
ing one-for-one. 
However,  this is not the only equilibrium. Having each sector traverse 
the maximal cycle with  any phasing  between  the two  sectors is also an 
equilibrium.  Relative consumer  good  prices are set by the stocks of the 
two  consumer  goods  and  would  change  over  the  cycle,  but each  con- 
sumer would  be content  to acquire half of whatever  is being produced.  (I 
assume  that  consumers  in  the  two  sectors  have  the  same  lifetime  in- 
comes even  though  they are out of phase.)  Labor supply and production 
decisions  satisfy  the  same  condition  as  before.  I have  not  considered 
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they can under suitable conditions.  It is clear that they can both be in the 
same cycle even  if it is not the maximal cycle. 
Now  let us  consider  the implications  of allowing  perfectly mobile la- 
bor. First note  that in the perfectly coordinated  cycle, there is no reason 
to  trade  labor  since  the  wage  is  the  same  in  both  sectors.  However, 
increasing  returns  with  greater  labor  inputs  would  tend  to  desyn- 
chronize  production,  because  of the efficiency  gains.  Thus, labor mobil- 
ity will tend  to generate  out-of-phase  cycles as productivity  shows  even 
larger swings  along with the larger swings  in labor input.  Labor mobility 
costs  would  work  against  desynchronization.  So  too  would  capacity 
constraints in the two sectors. However,  capacity constraints are endoge- 
nous  variables.  I  suspect  that  in  many  equilibria,  aggregate  capacity 
would  exceed  aggregate  labor supply,  permitting  asynchronous  move- 
ments.  Thus, we must turn to limits on intertemporal budget constraints 
to make  a stronger  case  for coordinated  cycles.  Thus  this  production- 
based cycle theory needs  demand  conditions. 
Again  assuming  immobile  labor, let  us  turn  to  the  other  budgetary 
extreme,  allowing  only barter trade in newly  produced consumer goods. 
(Thus consumers  can not trade out of stocks.) Note that this is not only a 
limitation on borrowing,  but also on saving.  It is clear that the perfectly 
coordinated cycle remains an equilibrium. When both sectors are produc- 
ing,  the  goods  trade  one  for one.  If only  one  sector  were  producing, 
there could be no trade. Thus it is clear that this budgetary  assumption 
limits  the  extent  to  which  the  two  markets  can be  out  of  phase.  For 
example,  we  can no longer  have  the two sectors perfectly out of phase. 
To see  this  consider  the  case  where  the  two  phases  have  the  same 
length.  If the two  sectors were  perfectly out of phase,  there could be no 
barter trade.  Thus  the  stock  of  the  "other" consumer  good  would  be 
going  to zero.  At some  point,  this justifies  production  and trade even  if 
no one else in your sector is producing  (i.e.,  at productivity  x). 
It is natural to ask how  much  out of phase  the  two  sectors  can be.  I 
have not considered  this in detail. There is the complication  of the terms 
of trade when  there is a corner solution,  with  one  of the sectors giving 
up all its current production  in trade. I do want to describe one equilib- 
rium cycle, assuming  that trade is one for one. This will imply that when 
both sectors  are producing,  both will give  up all their output  for all the 
output  of the  other  sector unless  the marginal rates of substitution  are 
the same in both sectors.  In the example I will consider, positions  will be 
symmetric  during  trade,  so there is no problem with the assumption  of 
one  for one  trade.  We start with  both  sectors  having  the  same  equal 
stocks of both  goods.  At this point  one  of the sectors  stops  producing, 
with  the other continuing  to produce  and adding its entire output  to its Comment 299 
stock of its own  durable.  After some  time,  the two sectors reverse posi- 
tions.  (Presumably,  there  could  also  be  a time  with  both  sectors  shut 
down.)  After some  more time the sectors have equal levels  of their own 
durables (and the sectors have equal levels  of each other's durables). At 
this time both sectors produce,  with all production going to the stocks of 
the other sector. This phase  continues  until we return to the initial point 
where  all four stocks are equal.  Pricing conditions  will limit the lengths 
of  the  different  portions  of  this  cycle.  On  this  equilibrium  cycle,  the 
correlation in production  is approximately  zero. It is precisely increasing 
returns which  appears to make this cycle possible.  With constant returns 
and barter, the sectors would  both be on or both be off in this symmetric 
structure.  Thus  locating  increasing  returns  in  consumer  trade,  rather 
than just in production,  appears  to be an attractive part of this  sort of 
model. 
3. Labor  market  flows 
In this model  all firms behave  the  same.  However,  the labor market is 
marked by huge  gross  flows  of labor (Abowd  and Zellner 1985; Poterba 
and Summers  1986). Moreover there are huge gross flows of job creation 
and job destruction  (Leonard 1988, Davis and Haltiwanger  1989). These 
facts raise two  questions-the  appropriateness  of the labor immobility 
assumption  which  is  critical for  preventing  the  efficiency  gains  from 
desynchronization  and  the  appropriateness  of  the  real business  cycle 
assumption  that equilibrium is on the labor supply  curve. 
It is natural to ask whether  one thinks that the basic increasing returns 
model  could  be fitted up to accommodate  the facts of large gross flows. 
There  would  be  no  difficulty  superimposing  on  the  structure  of  this 
model  a  pattern  of  individual,  idiosyncratic  productivity  shocks  that 
generated  a pattern of production  starts and stops on an individual basis 
on top of the economy-wide  moves  (see,  e.g.,  Blanchard and Diamond 
1989). This would  allow a diverse pattern of job creation and destruction. 
However,  this modification  implies  a large available labor supply  which 
makes  the assumption  of labor immobility  very uncomfortable.  The ad- 
vantage  of the increasing  returns story is that demand  swings  will natu- 
rally move  productivity  together  in  all  sectors.  Thus  some  increasing 
returns in production  are a plausible  part of a cycle model.  Such increas- 
ing returns alone  are inadequate. 
The model  assumes  that the  economy  is always  on  the labor supply 
curve.  There are two  ways  to view  this assumption.  One is that the as- 
sumption  is convenient,  though  unrealistic, while studying the workings 
of the other parts of the model.  The alternative is to consider the assump- 300  DISCUSSION 
tion to be a plausible  approximation  to the workings  of the labor market. 
The large gross  flows  imply that some  people  are working and some are 
not at all times.  In order to induce  the fluctuations  in labor supply,  the 
model  needs  (and has) procyclical real wage  movements.  Yet those who 
are unemployed  at good  times are choosing  to take their time out of work 
at a time of high real wages.  Of course,  this can be partially rescued by a 
Lucas-Prescott (1974) unemployment  while  moving  between  jobs. How- 
ever that model  is not  consistent  with  the widely  varying  durations  of 
unemployment  across individuals.  Thus, I feel that the assumption  that 
equilibrium  occurs  on  the  labor supply  curve  is  an inaccurate interim 
assumption  until we know  how  to build better models. 
The bottom  line is that we  have  one more way  of consistently  model- 
ing cyclically varying profitability of production,  if only we could explain 
why  the labor market works as it does.  That remains a basic puzzle. 
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problem,  but that rather  firm size and growth data tend to favor  constant 
returns. 
David Romer asked whether this model should be taken literally or 
metaphorically  in light of the 1982 recession. Shleifer said that this is a 
model of propagation  and dynamics, not shocks. Romer  responded that 
the model predicts that the stock of durables  would explain  the duration 
of business cycles and asked if this was the case. Vishny said that it is 
hard to interpret  the time series evidence on duration  dependence. 
Julio Rotemberg noted that if there were external economies, there 
would be no co-movement  at the aggregate  level. Murphy  responded  that 
there would be co-movement if specific sectors have varying  amounts of 
external economies. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki stated that the authors should 
specify their matching and transactions  technologies since the form of 
increasing  returns has implications  for persistence. 